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Abstract
A series of papers aimed at characterizing how decision makers (DMs) make choices based on past experi-
ences have revealed patterns that differ from those reported from description based decision making studies.
Choices based on past experiences typically involve providing a DM direct experience with gambles. Expe-
rience takes the form of feedback provided from independent random plays (or realizations) from a gamble.
The focus of this research is on experience based decision making where experience does not have real con-
sequences, but is thought of as a learning process. The DM is free to sample from the source generating the
gambles, without consequence, as many times as needed. During sampling, outcomes from the gamble have
no bearing on the final payment. Once the DM feels ready, he/she chooses a gamble for a one-shot play for
real money.
Two experiments are presented to test the impact of three manipulations: experience, initial information
states, and motivating incentives. The dependent variables include the DMs’ choices, experienced samples,
and estimated functional forms of Cumulative Prospect Theory. Results indicated that the manipulation of
experience in the presence of a full description produced almost no effects. The manipulation of initial infor-
mation states significantly influenced choices, the perceptions of risk, and the experienced samples. Choices
show significant differences due to initial information that support under-weighting of small probabilities
for groups exposed to experience without a full description. Ratings of risk perception are less discriminat-
ing between gambles with rare wins and rare losses for groups without a full description when compared to
groups with a full description. Initial information states also influence experienced samples showing different
search patterns between the two gambles that can be simultaneously sampled. The third manipulation of
motivating incentives significantly influenced the experienced samples and perception of risk. Experienced
samples are longer and produce less estimation error when motivated by probability estimation. The per-
ception of risk also shows significantly less discrimination between gambles with rare losses and rare wins
when compared to groups with full descriptions. Finally, estimates of weighting functions from Cumulative
Prospect Theory are more linear for groups with incentive to estimate probability than for groups with
incentive of a one-shot play.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the field of Judgment and Decision Making there are two important traditions of research. The first
category is normative decision making where researchers seek to define rationality in choice. The second
category is “behavioral decision making” involving the study of un-aided choices. These two traditions for
research are closely tied together. In fact, some of the models developed to explain behavioral decision
making are derived from already established normative models. Research regarding normative theory in
decision making began very early in the development of the field of statistics. The first mathematical device
of interest aimed at capturing rationality is the concept of expected value. The expected value of a well
defined gamble (or random variable) g that offers x1, x2, . . . , xn with probability p1, p2, . . . , pn such that∑n
i=1 pi = 1 is defined as,
EV (g) =
n∑
i=1
xipi. (1.1)
More advanced contributions to normative decision making have come from mathematics with the von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) axioms of expected utility theory (EUT) and game theory. Experts use
these tools to engineer decisions demonstrating consistent choices based on the preferences of the decision
maker (DM). The fundamental idea that EUT defines rationality as consistency in choice highlights the
importance of examining choices that people make. This definition of rationality is also important to
behavioral decision making research.
1.1 Expected Utility Theory
Expected Utility Theory posits that there are fundamental qualities desirable to preserve when making
choices. These qualities are stated as mathematical axioms from which the functional application of EUT
is derived. The notation and operations applied in the mathematical construction of preferences is first
reviewed. I define two operations on prospects - preference and indifference, denoted “” and “∼” respec-
tively. Let A be a finite set of prospects u, v, w, . . ., and define strict preference of u over v by denoting
u  v. Treat α, β, and γ as probabilities bounded by (0, 1). EUT requires that probabilities are known so
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these are often referred to as objective probabilities.
Axiom 1 Completeness - Any set of prospects can be characterized by some preference relation of either
u  v, u ∼ v, or v  u.
Axiom 2 Transitivity - If u  v and v  w then u  w.
Axiom 3 Continuity - u  w  v implies the existence of α such that αu+ (1− α)v  w.
Axiom 4 Independence - If u ∼ v then prospect u can substituted for v without consequence.
Axiom 5 Reduction - α(βu+ (1− β)v) + (1− α)v ∼ γu+ (1− γ)v where γ = αβ.
A utility function, denoted as U(x) represents a DM’s preferences (g)  (g′) implies EU(g) > EU(g) .
Expected utility of gamble g with outcomes and probabilities, listed as xi and pi respectively, will be defined
as,
EU(g) =
∑
outcomes
U(xi)pi. (1.2)
Determining choices between gambles using expected utility ensures the consistency of a DM as long as
his/her preferences are static.
1.2 Subjective Expected Utility Theory
EUT assumes that the probabilities associated with gambles are known. Objective probabilities are typically
thought of in terms of the frequentist perspective where probabilities of sets are defined by the relative
frequency of a large set of trials. Savage (1954) produced a new set of axioms which incorporate the use of
subjective probabilities into EUT. This set of axioms defines Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEUT). A
subjective probability is typically defined as a degree of belief in the occurrence of an event. A DM viewing an
urn containing 100 red and white marbles with the composition unknown would form a subjective probability
of drawing a red marble. The subjective utility of a gamble xi is based on a weighted combination of the
utility of each gamble outcome with the subjective probability, denoted P (xi).
SEU(g) =
∑
outcomes
U(xi)P (xi). (1.3)
1.2.1 Violations of Procedural Invariance
For EUT and SEUT the first step is to acquire information about a DM’s preference. At first glance this
might appear to be a simple task; ask a DM for his or her preferences. Procedural invariance assumes that
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preferences are not impacted by the method in which they are measured (or elicited). Many psychological
studies (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1973; Tversky, Slovic, & Kahneman, 1990; Tversky & Thaler 1990) demon-
strate that DMs can be inconsistent in stating their preferences across different methods of elicitation. For
example, if you ask a DM for the minimal selling price they are willing to accept for several gambles, one
can infer their preferences by ordering their prices. However, if you ask a DM to choose one of the gambles,
DMs may choose a gamble which was not given the highest selling price. These preference reversals reveal
that there is something fundamentally different about the methods used to elicit these preferences and are
viewed as violations of procedural invariance.
1.3 Description Based Decision Making
Description based decision making provides a DM with full information about the outcomes and their
probabilities of occurrence. For example, consider two gambles: the first gamble will pay $5.00 with certainty;
the second gamble will pay $0.50 with a probability of 0.85, and $8.75 with a probability of 0.15. Choices
between gambles of this type reveal attitudes to risk, types of preferences, and systematic reactions to
different types of frames. Gambles are referred to using the notation (x, p; y, q), with outcomes x and y and
probabilities of occurrence p and q respectively. The previous gambles can be written as ($5, 1; $0, 0) and
($0.5, 0.85; $8.75, 0.15). Additionally, outcomes equal to $0 are removed such that ($5, 1; $0, 0) is equivalent
to ($5, 1).
1.3.1 Some Behavioral Violations of Expected Utility Theory
I review six important empirical findings suggesting that human DMs do not act as EU maximizers (Kah-
neman & Tversky 1972).
Certainty Effect states that DMs will strongly prefer an outcome that is certain to an outcome that is
uncertain, even at a premium.
Reflection Effect states that there are different patterns of preferences in the domain of losses than in the
domain of gains (where gains and lossses are defined by comparison to a reference point). DMs make
choices which reflect opposite risk preferences in the two domains.
Isolation Effect provides further evidence of the role of gains and losses. Two sets of gambles can be
created which produce equal outcomes due to a previous endowment. An example is gamble G1 =
($1000, .5;−$1000, .5) and gamble G2 = $1000 + ($0, .5;−$2000, .5). Choices reveal that the gambles
3
Table 1.1: The four fold pattern of risk tendency.
Probability Gain Loss
Low Risk Seeking Risk Aversion
High Risk Aversion Risk Seeking
are isolated from the riskless endowment and treated differently. This shows that final states of wealth
are not as salient as previously assumed.
Loss Aversion posits that choices reveal a stronger aversion for losses than would be expected based
on the preference of gains of the same magnitude. E.g., most DMs faced with a choice between
G1 = ($x, .5;−$x, .5) and G2 = ($2x, .5;−$2x, .5) prefer G1 which produces a smaller loss.
Four Fold Pattern is the observation that risk tendencies are driven by an interaction between probability
magnitudes with the gain/loss domain. See Table 1.1.
Over-weighting of small probability explains the risk seeking behavior associated with a low probability
of a gain (see Table 1.1).
A set of gambles designed to test deviations from EUT is presented in Table 1.2. The far right column
of the table shows the percent of DMs who chose gamble A in a pairwise choice. The inconsistency of a DM
is shown by the differing choices (also known as preference reversals) made between the two sets of gambles
predicted to induce identical choices by the EUT axioms.
I work through the logic of EUT using preference notation. The first gamble from Table 1.2 shows that for
a majority of DMs A ≺ B. This implies certain constraints on the utility function (as shown by Kahneman &
Tversky 1979) such that U(2, 400) > .33U(2, 500)+.66U(2, 400)⇒ .34U(2, 400) > .33U(2, 500)⇒ U(2,400)U(2,500) >
.33
.34 . The second set of gambles shows that for a majority of the same DMs A  B which implies the utility
function to be constrained such that .33U(2, 500) > .34U(2, 400) ⇒ U(2,400)U(2,500) < .33.34 . The utility function for
the first set of gambles contradicts the utility function of the second set of gambles demonstrating a violation
of rational behavior as predicted by EUT.
Gamble set 1 for the reflection effect in Table 1.2 shows that A ≺ B. This suggests that the utility relation
is U(3, 000) > .8U(4, 000). Multiplying both sides by negative one implies that U(3, 000) < .8U(4, 000)
should produce a reflection effect. The proportions in Table 1.2 show that negative values lead to a reversal
of preference so that B ≺ A. The isolation effect shows a reversal where the first gamble set can be viewed
in terms of final possible states U(1, 500) > .5U(2000) + .5U(1, 000) and the second gamble set reveals
U(1, 500) < .5U(2000) + .5U(1, 000).
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Table 1.2: Gambles used to uncover violations of EUT.
Empirical result Set Gamble A Gamble B %A
Certainty Effect 1 ($2500, .33; $2400, .66; $0, .01) (2400, 1) 18
($2500, .33; $0, .67) ($2400, .34; $0, .66) 83
2 ($4000, .80; $0, .20) ($3000, 1) 20
($4000, .20; $0, .80) ($3000, .25; $0, .75) 65
Reflection Effect 1 ($4000, .80; $0, .20) ($3000, 1) 20
($-4000, .80; $0, .20) ($-3000, 1) 92
2 ($4000, .20; $0, .80) ($3000, .25; $0, .75) 65
($-4000, .20; $0, .80) ($-3000, .25; $0, .75) 42
3 ($3000, .90; $0, .10) ($6000, .45; $0, .55) 86
($-3000, .90; $0, .10) ($-6000, .45; $0, .55) 8
4 ($3000, .002; $0, .998) ($6000, .001; $0, .999) 27
($-3000, .002; $0, .998) ($-6000, .001; $0, .999) 70
Isolation Effect 1 $1000 + ($1000, .50; $0, .50) ($500, 1) 16
$2000 + ($-1000, .50; $0, .50) ($-500, 1) 69
Loss Aversion ($x,.5;-$x,.5) ($2x,.5;-$2x,.5)
1.3.2 Cumulative Prospect Theory
Tversky and Kahneman constructed the previous sets of gambles and produced two papers (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) introducing a new model of behavioral decision making called
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT).
CPT incorporates a modification of utility maximization. While CPT shares many of the virtues of utility
theories, there are several differences. EUT deals with absolute wealth status while CPT uses a reference
point from which the DM views the outcomes of a gamble in terms of gains and losses. A value function,
denoted v(x), represents the value of gains/losses relative to a reference point. The final important deviation
from EUT is that the probabilities are transformed by a non-linear weighting function w(p), which represents
the impact of probabilities on overall value. This weighting function recognizes that changes in probability
are very different depending on where they occur. Increasing a probability of 0.9 to 1.0 is very important
to a DM because this change is the difference between risk and certainty. If I increase a probability of 0.5
similarly (producing 0.6), the impact is reduced to a DM.
The weighting function transforms the weight of each outcome to be the marginal contribution of that
outcome. Gains are computed based on capacities as the difference between the set of events that are at
least as good and those that are strictly better. For example, if xi > 0 then w
+(pi) = W
+(pi ∪ pi+1 ∪ . . . ∪
pn) −W+(pi+1 ∪ . . . ∪ pn). Weights for losses are computed as the difference between events that are at
least as bad and those that are strictly worse given by: xi < 0 then w
−(pi) = W−(p−m ∪ . . . ∪ pi−1 ∪ pi)−
W−(p−m ∪ . . . ∪ pi−1). Similar to utility based theories, the valuation of a gamble g is generated by the
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weighted sum of the value function and the probability weighting function given by,
V +(g) =
∑
outcomes
v+(xi)w
+(pi) and V
−(g) =
∑
outcomes
v−(xi)w−(pi). (1.4)
Several functional forms for the value function v(xi) and the weighting function w(pi) have been used. I
will focus on the power value function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) given by,
v(x) =
 x
α for x > 0
−λ(−x)β for x < 0
(1.5)
This function is characterized by three parameters. The α and β coefficients define the curvature of the
value function. Typically 0 < α, β < 1 represents a value function which diminishes with respect to the
objective value x. The loss aversion coefficient, λ, defines a steeper value function in the domain of losses
with values of λ > 1.
There are two functional forms of interest for the weighting function. The functional form proposed by
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) given by,
w+(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ and w
−(p) =
pδ
(pδ + (1− p)δ)1/δ . (1.6)
The γ and δ parameters define an inverse s shape curve for parameter values such that 0 < γ, δ < 1. The
inverse s shape suggests that small (large) probabilities are over-weighted (under-weighted). Additionally,
values for which γ, δ > 1 produce an opposite s shaped curve, indicating that small probabilities are under-
weighted. The inverse s shape curve produces predictions which support the four fold pattern discussed
above; the s shape curve will be discussed further in a later section.
The second functional form for the weighting function is presented by Prelec (1998) as the one parameter
compound-invariant form given by:
w(p) = exp[−(− ln p)γprelec ], (γprelec > 0). (1.7)
This function behaves in a similar fashion as the weighting function introduced by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992). Parameter values such that γprelec < 1 produce the inverse s shaped curve. When γprelec = 1 the
weighting function is linear, and identically reproduces unaltered probabilities. Values such that γprelec > 1
produce the opposite s shaped curve suggesting that small probability is under-weighted.
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1.4 Departures from Description Based Decision Making
In recent years, a series of papers aimed at characterizing how DMs make choices based on past experiences
has revealed patterns that differ from those reported in DBDM studies. Choices based on past experiences
typically involve providing a DM direct experience that takes the form of feedback provided from independent
random plays (or realizations) from a gamble. I distinguish between two methods of feedback commonly
utilized: (1) Feedback Based Decision Making (FBDM) and (2) Experience Based Decision Making (EBDM).
Also see Hertwig and Pleskac (2007) for an excellent review of the difference between the two.
1.4.1 Feedback Based Decision Making
Feedback Based Decision Making (FBDM) provides feedback with real payment. In other words, participants
sample from unknown gambles where each sample outcome is tallied to provide an overall payoff (with or
without knowledge of forgone outcomes). Feedback based decision making forces a DM to strike a balance
between optimization and exploration. Optimization leads to continually playing the gamble that is believed
to provide the best payoff. Exploration leads to a deeper understanding of both gambles, but requires
sampling from a potentially inferior gamble.
Consider the example of a driver speeding down a specific road repeatedly (e.g., a commute to work).
The driver might know the amount of the last ticket paid but not know the current fine. Each time he or
she drives down the road he can classify the experience into the following four events: (a) an un-eventful
trip; (b) passing another driver who has been pulled over; (c) passing a stationary police car; (d) getting
pulled over.
This is an example of feedback based decision making because each of the “experiences” has real conse-
quences. If the driver is pulled over, he or she will experience a real loss in the form of a speeding ticket.
1.4.2 Experience Based Decision Making
Experience in EBDM does not have real consequences and is thought of as a learning process. The DM is
free to sample from the gambles, without consequence, as many times as needed. During sampling, outcomes
from the gamble have no impact on the final payment. Once the DM feels ready, he/she chooses a gamble
for a one-shot play for real money.
Consider a young adult who is attempting to prepare a retirement fund. There are many sources of online
advice about how to invest in stocks and mutual funds. This investor discovers a web site that allows the
investor to allocate play-money to different types of investments. Once the portfolio is complete, the investor
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can click on a button to simulate the passing of 10, 20, or 30 years and view the status of his simulated
retirement fund. This process can be repeated as many times as needed. A final portfolio is generated once
the investor is satisfied that he or she understands the risks associated with different options.
In this example, “experiences” have no consequences except to act as a representation of a risk. No money
is gained or lost from trial to trial until the investor decides that no more can be learned from performing
additional simulations.
There are four important features that are unique to this method: (1) consequence free learning, (2) self
termination of learning, (3) participant guided search, and (4) the final, one shot, random payment. These
dimensions separate EBDM from FBDM and will be important in the formation of hypotheses about how
experience is treated by DMs.
Consequence free learning refers to the fact that there is no pressure on the participant during the learning
phase. This type of scenario might not be effective in triggering optimizing search routines from participants.
Participants may carelessly play gambles or may act differently in their search pattern compared to if there
were consequences for each choice they made.
Self termination of learning phase means each DM can reach a point at which he or she decides they
are ready to make a decision. Self termination allows for some DMs to only sample a few times from each
gamble or to sample 100 times before making a choice. Each DM can deal with the amount of information
with which they are comfortable.
Participant guided search allows the DM to sample from the different gambles in any order he or she
chooses. Many psychological factors come into play when considering the role of participant guided search.
What are DMs doing when sampling gambles; is the ultimate objective for sampling to estimate the prob-
ability of a target event? There could be several models of evaluation which do not involve a subjective
estimate of probability, but rather, values are tallied or perceived as relative frequencies. Order effects also
could have a large role in the evaluation of the gamble. The final choice for payment might only depend on
the gamble the participant selected most recently.
Final, one shot, random payment is the final aspect of this paradigm. In many studies of decisions from
experience, incentive to search for information is to choose a gamble which will result in the highest one
time payoff. Giving DM’s different tasks to perform such as correctly estimating the payoff probability, or
correctly guessing the distribution of outcomes in 10 trials, could trigger different types of search strategies.
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1.4.3 The Money Machine Paradigm
The typical research paradigm for studying decisions from experience often uses a “money machine” that
provides the DM with outcomes from selecting to play a machine (sometimes called the clicking paradigm).
The money machine can be used for both feedback based and experience based decision making. In FBDM
each machine is tallied to provide a cumulative payoff for the experiment. Gamble preference is usually
indicated by convergence (repeatedly selecting the same gamble) or majority (if there is no convergence). In
EBDM, the money machine is played until the participant feels comfortable in selecting the machine which
will be played for actual money. I will focus on money machine applications to EBDM.
The money machine has buttons which represent different gambles. When a button is pressed by a DM,
the machine randomly generates one of the outcomes of the gamble. Each time the machine is played, the
DM sees the outcome of the gamble chosen.
The gambles listed in Table 1.2 can be played in the money machine paradigm: the random variable
which governs the outcomes of the machine can be programmed to have the same probabilities and outcomes
as the gambles in Table 1.2. However, since the outcomes are random, one cannot assume that the gamble, as
theoretically defined, will be accurately represented by the random draws (or realizations). In other words,
the relative frequencies observed by the DM may not match exactly the probabilities that define the random
outcomes. This implies that there is an important theoretical difference between the gamble definitions and
the experiences of each gamble.
It is important to recognize that the current paradigm matches the assumptions required for SEUT in
that the probability of each outcome is unknown, and a subjective probability must be generated.
The current proposal focuses on EBDM and the processes which may come into play when a DM is
attempting to experience optimally (i.e., to discover the best gamble for a one shot play in the least amount
of time), and to identify helpful aspects of experience for understanding how DMs summarize and make
choices based on random information.
1.4.4 Recent Literature
First I review work on feedback based studies. These experiments contain elements not present in EBDM.
Several design similarities make it important to be familiar with the results of these experiments. Second I
review recent studies performed on EBDM.
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Review of Feedback Based Decision Making Literature
Feedback based decision making consists of repeated play for real payoffs. Studies performed in the DBDM
paradigm have found that repeated play can influence choices. For this reason, results based on FBDM
studies might not generalize to EBDM.
Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, and Schwartz (1997) explored investor behavior, and attempted to explain
investment using the concepts of loss aversion (from Prospect Theory), mental accounting, and myopia. The
term “myopic loss aversion” (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995) explains how risks associated with investment can
be evaluated. Myopic loss aversion is a combination of a heightened disutility for losses and the tendency to
evaluate a temporal risk frequently. This frequency of gamble evaluation can be used in combination with
CPT to make predictions about preferences.
The theory developed by Thaler and colleagues is that more myopic investors will tend to prefer gambles
with less risk. To test this theory, subjects were required to evaluate two gambles in a FBDM design
where no information was given except for experience in the form of real payoffs from the gambles. The
gambles were set up as draws from two normal distributions, one low risk representing bonds, and one
high risk representing stocks. Results provide support for the theory of myopic loss aversion: elimination of
negative outcomes increased preferences for stocks. Additionally forcing non-myopic strategies also increased
preferences for stocks, providing support for the predicted effects of myopic framing.
Barron and Erev (2003) extended the studies conducted by Thaler et al. (1997) using the feedback
based money machine paradigm described earlier. Experiment 1 replicated loss aversion and demonstrate
the impact of heightened variability to reduce the ability to converge on the optimal gamble.
Experiment 2 provides evidence counter to CPT predictions with a reversed common ratio effect (reversed
certainty effect). This effect is attributed to the payoff variability effect (which is not a factor in CPT).
Experiment 3 provides evidence in support of a reversed payoff domain effect (reversed reflection effect).
Finally, experiment 4 finds that DMs act as if under-weighting small probabilities (DBDM shows over-
weighting of small probabilities). These experiments demonstrate clear differences in many of the empirical
findings supported by CPT. The results suggest that a different mechanism might be impacting decisions
made with feedback.
Erev, Ert, and Yechiam (2008) use the same feedback based paradigm to investigate the plausibility of
diminishing sensitivity to explain the results of Thaler et al. (1998). This research was inspired by results
from even earlier work by Katz (1964) using a light bulb design which is similar to the money machine. Katz
used gambles resembling problem 5 in Table 1.3 and did not find evidence for loss aversion.
Experiment 1 in Erev, Ert, and Yechiam (2008) is a direct comparison of loss aversion and diminishing
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Table 1.3: Gambles used by Feedback Based Decision Making by Erev, Ert, and Yechiam (2008).
Problem Safe Risky %Safe
1 (0,1) (1000, 0.5; -1000, 0.5) 53
2 (1000,1) (2000, 0.5; 0, 0.5) 70
3 (400, 1) (1400, 0.5; -600, 0.5) 76
4 (1400, 1) (2400, 0.5; 400, 0.5) 66
5 (200, 0.5; -200, 0.5) (1000, 0.5; -1000, 0.5) 43
6 (1200, 0.5; 800, 0.5) (2000, 0.5; 0, 0.5) 72
7 0 + u(0,1) (-1, 0.5; 2, 0.5) + u(0,1) Low=49, High=57
8 3 + u(0,1) (2, 0.5; 5, 0.5) + u(0,1) Low=55, High=47
9 TN(.25, .177, 0) N(1, 3.54) Low=49, High=60
10 TN(12.25, .177, 12) N(13, 3.54) Low=53, High=50
sensitivity. Diminishing sensitivity refers to the concave shape of the utility function in which changes in
large values provide less change in utility than comparable changes in small values. Problems 1 and 2 in
Table 1.3 are used in the first part of the experiment. Loss aversion predicts a preference for the safe gamble
in both problems. Diminishing sensitivity predicts indifference in problem 1 and preference for the safe
gamble in problem 2. The choice proportions for “safe” in Table 1.3 support the predictions of diminishing
sensitivity.
The second part of Experiment 1 uses problems 5 and 6 from Table 1.3 and is designed to test zero
avoidance, the idea that boredom will drive participants to avoid the gamble which pays zero consistently.
The choice proportions from these problems also support diminishing sensitivity predictions.
Experiment 2 investigates the nominal magnitude effect. In this experiment there are two conditions for
problems 7 - 9 in Table 1.3, manipulating the magnitude of the value of the gambles. Participants play each
gamble for points, which are converted into cash at the end of the experiment based on a predetermined
conversion rate. Points remain as shown in the table for the low condition. In the high condition, the points
are multiplied by 100. The conversion of the payoffs to cash is altered as well (subjects are informed of their
conversion rates at the beginning) so that participants in both the high and low group end up with the same
amount of money. The authors conclude that the choice proportions in Table 1.3 for the safe gamble show
support for the nominal magnitude effect. This result is particularly interesting because the magnitude of
the actual payment was not altered, only the number of decimal places in the point system.
These results indicate an impact of diminishing sensitively in FBDM. Diminishing sensitivity is supported
by the value function of SEU and CPT discussed previously. These results also suggest that boredom should
not play a large role in using gambles with zero outcomes (this is the case for many EBDM studies to
be discussed). Finally, the magnitude of the payoffs, despite the conversion rate, may affect the results of
performing feedback based experiments.
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Jessup, Bishara, and Busemeyer (2008) provide an analysis of feedback in the presence of full description.
They use decision field theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) to model choice behavior in DBDM with and
without feedback. Parameter estimates capture the shape of a utility function as well as the probability
weighting function. Decision field theory is shown to provide a good fit to the data. The authors identify
the parameter γPrelec
1 from Equation 1.7 as the only parameter that distinguishes between groups with
and without feedback. This parameter determines the shape of the probability weighting function (Prelec,
1998). Description based decisions are estimated with γPrelec = .90 where feedback based decisions have
γPrelec = .98. These group level estimates (the authors do not clarify if these are median or mean) indicate
that the experienced feedback produce a weighting function closer to an identity function that does not
under-weight small probability.
The empirical evidence from FBDM shows very clearly that the clicking paradigm has produced a decision
scenario that is not well explained by CPT. Many of these results extend into the EBDM paradigm, leading
to the question of whether new theories are required to describe how decisions are made in feedback based
scenarios.
1.4.5 Review of Experience Based Decision Making Literature
The feedback based paradigm provides each DM with experience from each gamble in the form of repeated
payment. Experienced Based Decision Making (EBDM) attempts to separate experience from payment by
having the DM perform a final choice after the experience is acquired (e.g., Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev,
2004; Weber, Shafir, & Blais, 2004; Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008; Rakow, Demes, & Newell, 2008).
Weber, Shafir, and Blais (2004) provide a meta-analysis in an attempt to link research on risky behavior
by animals and humans. The authors demonstrate the usefulness of the Coefficient of Variation (CV) in
predicting risky behavior. The authors conduct a study on human decision makers using decks of cards
(similar to the money machine) to represent binary gambles, where all four features of EBDM hold (see
Table 1.4). The participants experience (1) consequence free learning, (2) self termination of learning, (3)
participant guided search, and (4) one shot payment incentive based on their choices. Results indicate that
the CV is a better predictor of risk aversion (risk aversion increases as CV increases) than variance. This
suggests that the mean payment is important in making risky choices under EBDM.
A study by Hertwig et al. (2004) uses the money machine paradigm to extend Barron and Erev (2003).
The study was designed to eliminate the confound of repeated play from feedback based decision making.
Several of the gambles in Table 1.5 were used by Barron and Erev (2003) and revealed choice patterns
1The authors use the symbol λ.
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Table 1.4: The four important features of EBDM studies.
Consequence Self Participant One-Shot
Free Learning Termination Guided Search Play
Weber et al. 2004
√ √ √ √
Hertwig et al. 2004
√ √ √ √
Hau et al. in press
Study 1 & 2
√ √ √ √
Study 3
√ √ √
Rakow et al. (2008)
√ √
Ungemach et al. (in press)
√ √ √
Table 1.5: Gambles used by Hertwig et al. (2004), Hau et al. (2008), and Ungemach et al. (2009).
Hertwig %H Hua %H Ungemach %H
Problem High Low Exp Desc Exp Std2 Std3 Desc Exp Matched Desc
1* (4,.8) (3, 1) 88 36 62 56 65 33 64 48 36
2 (4,.2) (3, .25) 44 64 55 51 78 72 56 60 72
3 (-3. 1) (-32, .1) 28 64 11 36 30 37 16 28 64
4* (-3, 1) (-4, .8) 56 28 45 36 55 31 68 32 36
5 (32, .1) (3, 1) 20 48 15 36 40 63 8 16 48
6 (32, .025) (3, .25) 12 64 28 46 38 47 28 28 52
*Gambles for which %H is in the direction of under-weighting small probabilities.
consistent with under-weighting small probabilities. The study investigates if under-weighting would also
occur in EBDM where there are no consequences attached to the experiences. Results show that choice
proportions in EBDM do not match the choice proportions observed under DBDM (see Table 1.5). Instead
of over-weighting small probabilities as predicted by CPT and observed in decisions from description, DMs
appear to act “as if” under-weighting small probabilities. The results support the theory that repeated play
is not directly causing the reversal in how probabilities are weighted.
The authors provide several theories for why DMs in EBDM act as if under-weighting small probabilities.
The first potential cause is a reliance on small samples. They report a median of 15 draws per machine before
making a decision with roughly equal draws from both problems. These small samples can cause subjects
to under estimate small probabilities (instead of under-weighting) because of the nature of the binomial
distribution. Therefore, small samples provide a very plausible explanation for the results and emphasize
that gambles in a money machine do not directly represent their underlying parameters.
Recency effects are also used to explain under-weighting of small probabilities. The experienced samples
were divided into early experiences and recent experiences. The authors report that the second half of the
sample had stronger predictive power than the early half in support of recency effects.
A response to Hertwig et al. (2004) by Fox and Hadar (2004) highlights the distinction between estimation
and weighting. The authors of both articles report sampling error as a potential force in reducing the impact
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of unlikely events. The distinction is that estimation of the probability of unknown distributions does not
reflect the same type of judgmental bias which is implied by the weighting of probabilities when making
choices.
A re-analysis of these data using experienced probabilities (probabilities representative of the actual
samples) instead of objective probabilities (probabilities used to generate the outcomes) showed an increased
conformity to the predictions of CPT and the two stage model for decisions under uncertainty (Tversky &
Fox, 1995). The accuracy of predictions of the CPT two stage model increase from 40% to 63% when using
experienced probabilities instead of objective probabilities.
Hua et al. (2008) extended the work of Hertwig et al. (2004) by running two additional experimental
conditions with the sample problem set (see Table 1.5). These extensions are aimed at revealing the impor-
tance of sampling error in what they call the “description-experience gap.” Three studies were conducted
aimed at manipulating the sampling error in the samples drawn by the participants.
The first two studies retain all the characteristics of the original Hertwig et al. (2004) study. The
first study was a replication of the original findings. The second study provided higher incentives for the
participants in a successful effort to increase their sampling efforts. This study increased the payoff by a
factor of 10 and results show median draws of 33 cards (a 3-fold median increase from Study 1). They
also report that the average number of draws was roughly equal across decks. Study 2 also had subjects
give estimates of the probability of each outcome experienced. The probability estimates are on average
regressive, showing (slight) overestimation of small (and underestimation of large) probabilities, which is not
reflected in the subjects’ choices.
Study 3 increases experience by requiring the participants to sample 100 times (this manipulation alters
the dimension of self terminating learning phase). Results indicate that when DMs take larger samples of
each gamble, the choice proportions become closer to those in the description group, demonstrating the
importance of sampling error. However, the effects are still present and there are still differences between
experience and description based choices that are not explained.
The authors concluded with an analysis of 15 models predicting the choices based on the experienced
samples. The models which provide the highest percent of correct predictions tied at 69%: maximax and
the two stage CPT model (Tversky & Fox, 1995; Fox & Hadar, 2004). Models which perform almost as
well include: the natural mean (68%), lexicographic (68%), the priority heuristic (67%), the value-updating
model from Hertwig et. al. (2006) (66%), and the fractional adjustment model from March (1996) (65%).
Rakow, Demes, and Newell (2008) use yoked groups to examine the impact of experience. The information
that one participant sampled using a typical EBDM money machine was provided to the yoked participants.
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The first yoked group was given a description in the form of frequency directly reflecting the experienced
sample. The second yoked group sampled the money machines in the same order and received the same
outcomes (they could see both machines, but only one could be sampled). A third yoked group was given a
description of the experienced sample based on percentages. The results of this experiment show that there
is little difference between the yoked groups and the original EBDM group. The authors suggest that the
information contained in the experienced samples is most important. Additionally, a DBDM control group
also replicated the experience-description gap, as previously found. This is evidence that the experience-
description gap is not due to the simple act of sampling, but it is attributed to the small samples which are
relied upon.
I conclude that decisions based on experience are different from decisions based on description because
description gives full information. The results of this study suggest that describing the information contained
in the samples may produce similar choices to those who actively experience the samples.
Ungemach, Chater, and Stewart (2009) present an analysis of the impact of sampling error as well as
judgment error in EBDM. The method of removing sampling error involved adding a matched-sampling
condition, that required each DM to sample from each gamble 40 times (in any order they liked) and
the samples were pre-determined to match exactly the underlying probabilities. This ensured that the
experienced objective frequencies matched the descriptions exactly, and therefore removing sampling error
from decisions made from experience.
The first experiment replicated Hertwig et al. (2004) with the addition of the matched sample group.
Table 1.5 shows the choice percentages for the three conditions. In problem set 1 and 4 the percentages
for matched show a higher agreement with the percentages from description than in any other problem set,
but the general results from all gambles presented in the table is that under-weighting of small probabilities
cannot be eliminated by removing sampling error. Sampling error appears to play an important role in the
process, but there are other factors which must be identified.
A fit of the CPT model also reveals that the best predictions are made from parameters inducing a
weighting function which under-weights small probabilities. This assessment of CPT differs from previous
assessments. The authors provide a graphical representation for the fit of the CPT model from Equations
1.5 and 1.6 for 0 < α, β < 2 and 0 < γ, δ < 2.
The gambles were analyzed separately by gains (estimating α and γ) and losses (estimating β and δ), with
the parameters ranging from 0 to 2 (by increments of .01). The loss aversion parameter, λ, was not included
in the analysis. Parameter values γ, δ > 1 define weighting functions that underweight small probabilities,
and produce the best fit results (based on percent correct, maximum of 81% correct) providing support for
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under-weighting of small probabilities in EBDM.
Hertwig and Pleskac (2007) provide a compelling argument for why small samples make choices simpler.
The authors introduce the idea of the amplification effect. They prove that the average absolute difference
between sample means (i.e., the means of the experienced samples) will always be greater than the difference
of the expectation of the gambles. This effect is also demonstrated through simulation.
The proof provided by Hertwig and Pleskac (2007) involves a few simple steps. Assume two binomial
gambles A ∼ (Ha, pa, La, qa) and B ∼ (Hb, pb, Lb, qb). Define the sample mean of each gamble after n draws
as,
SMA =
kHa + (n− k)La
n
and SMB =
jHb + (n− j)Lb
n
. (1.8)
The number of draws of Ha and Hb are denoted by k and j respectively, and are defined as the binomial
success. Let Y = SMA − SMB . Assuming that E(A) > E(B) I can rewrite the expression for E(SMA −
SMB) = E(A)− E(B) as follows,
E(Y ) = p(Y > 0)p(Y |Y > 0) + p(Y < 0)p(Y |Y < 0) = E(A)− E(B) (1.9)
Finally the probability of abs(Y ) = |Y | can be shown as,
E(|Y |) = p(Y > 0)p(Y |Y > 0)− p(Y < 0)p(Y |Y < 0) ≥ E(A)− E(B) (1.10)
The amplification effect implies that, on average, DMs will feel a heightened differentiation between briefly
experienced gambles than typically felt by described gambles. The ability to document this type of effect is
a step in the direction of forming theories which do not rely on gamble descriptions, but general properties
of the experienced random sequences.
More recent studies have established the importance of information states in EBDM (Erev, Glozman, &
Hertwig, 2008; Hadar & Fox, 2009). Studying the differences in states of knowledge between EBDM and
DBDM may prove effective in assessing the impact of experience on decision making. I will return to this
idea after presenting a new classification system for information states in the next section.
Goals
My goal is to expand knowledge about how people behave (and make choices) in situations where gambles
are experienced. I presented recent findings suggesting that models of behavioral decision making based on
DBDM might not generalize to EBDM. There are several interesting aspects of EBDM which have not been
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closely investigated. I plan to keep the four defining features (see Table 1.4) intact. The only feature that
has not yet been manipulated is the one-shot play feature; I will present a theory and an experiment relating
to a manipulation of this feature.
Many decision models have been proposed to account for the DMs choices in EBDM. These models
include CPT, maximax, reinforcement learning models, and heuristics based on tallies and simple averages
of the experienced samples. They represent different methods of making decisions under risk and uncertainty.
The focus of the proposed work is to develop a framework that can be generalized to EBDM. I propose a
new classification of EBDM which will aid in organizing and developing theories in a systematic fashion.
Within the new framework for EBDM I will investigate the appropriateness of weighting functions in
situations which fall outside the category of risky decision making. I will define additional decision situations
related to decisions under risk, and the assumptions of CPT.
The money machine paradigm may confound the effects of experience with additional uncertainties
related to the DM’s initial state of knowledge where a DM has no information about the problem they face.
Within this context I will investigate more closely the search process and how it is utilized by the DM.
I plan to investigate three important topics related to information search (i.e., the consequence free
experience stage): (1) The definition of optimality; (2) Characterization of information search; (3) More
comprehensive model comparisons.
The definition of optimality. What is the optimal use of past experiences to produce the best decisions?
The proposal describes several methods of optimally estimating the probability of an outcome in a binary
gamble. The first method uses Bayesian inference with a uniform prior distribution on the parameter
p. After each draw the posterior distribution for p is revised and sampling terminates when the variance
of the posterior distribution reaches a predetermined (low) threshold. Other methods are frequentistic -
based on updating the variance (or the coefficient of variation - CV) of the estimate of p after each draw.
Sampling terminates when the variance (or the CV) reaches a predetermined cutoff value. The estimates
for the probabilities of each outcome associated with a money machine can then be used to evaluate the
gamble based on expected value, subjective expected utility, or even prospect theory (with certain parametric
assumptions).
Characterization of information search. There are several aspects of experienced samples that have not
been fully investigated. The first is the sequence length. The length has already been found to be associated
with the overall value of the gambles - larger incentives gives rise to longer sequences. The second component
is switching (alternation) tendency. When using a money machine, DMs are free to sample from the gambles
in any order they wish. This means they could explore Gamble A 10 times followed by exploring Gamble
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B 10 times, then make a final choice. This search pattern has only one switch. On the other hand, a DM
could draw from Gamble A only twice, before changing over to draw from Gamble B only twice. If this
alternation pattern is continued until 20 total samples are viewed, the number of switches is 9. I hypothesize
that an individual’s switching tendency will provide insight into how the decision maker is summarizing the
entire sample to make a choice between the two gambles. I plan to empirically test a new model of choice
(the contrast model) based on relative assessments of each gamble at each switch.
Comprehensive model comparisons. A complication of using experienced samples to predict final choices
is the randomness of the samples. This does not allow for complete control over the design of the experiment.
There are certain sequences that would produce an obvious choice, in which any model would make the same
prediction. For instance, some subjects may only press each button once, one of which gives a large outcome
and one of which gives a zero. Any decision model would likely predict the same outcome given this situation.
For this reason I propose to compare models using more criteria than just an overall percent correct, which
does not reveal if the underlying samples produced difficult choices or if the models themselves ever produced
differing choices. Additional comparisons will include techniques of a pair-wise nature which analyze percent
overlap, percent non-overlap, as well as percent correct when models make unique predictions.
The proposal is organized as follows. The first section presents a refined definition of EBDM highlighting
the importance of initial and final information states. This section also reviews several theories from behav-
ioral decision making and psychology that will be useful in generating predictions. The last sections describe
(1) normative models of probability estimation, (2) a detailed characterization of information search, and
(3) new behavioral models to be tested on experience samples.
1.5 Extensions of Experience Based Decision Making
I begin with a complete characterization of the current EBDM paradigm within the classical typology of
decision situations: (1) decisions under certainty, (2) decisions under risk, and (3) decisions under uncertainty.
This classification is important in aiding comparisons of results in EBDM to results in DBDM. I review the
classification used by Luce and Raiffa (1957) with the addition of vagueness.
Certainty involves situations where each action has an outcome that is known to occur (no other outcomes
can occur).
Risk involves situations where each action has a set of known outcomes in which the probability of realizing
each outcome is known to the DM.
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Vagueness involves situations where some (or all) properties of the outcomes and/or probabilities are
imprecisely (or partially) known. This can occur given ranges of possible outcomes, or by using verbal
descriptors.
Uncertainty involves situations where each action has a set of known outcomes in which the probability
of realizing each outcome is completely unknown (or not meaningful) to the DM.
Tasks used to provide empirical evidence for CPT, and over-weighting small probabilities, fall within
the category of decisions under risk. Categorizing typical DBDM studies within these three categories is a
trivial task, with exception to decisions under vagueness. Decisions under vagueness can be argued to fall on
a continuum between risk and uncertainty, depending on the type and amount of vagueness. It is important
to note that both uncertainty and risk require complete knowledge of the outcomes. Gambles which are
described typically meet this requirement.
Consider now the situation faced by a DM in a typical money machine based EBDM experiment. This
situation is removed from the decisions under risk category by two steps, (1) incomplete knowledge of the
outcomes associated with each gamble, and (2) the probability of each outcome occurring. At first glance
it would seem silly to even consider knowing the probability of each outcome without even knowing all the
possible outcomes. Knowledge of (and use of) probabilities in this situation has been the focus of many of
the papers associated with EBDM.
I classify and categorize all of the changes required to go from DBDM under risk to EBDM. A new
classification set should capture the process for how information is acquired as well as sensitivity to what
is known and what is unknown (both before and after experience). The following five categories could be
appended to the previous list describing uniquely a string of possible scenarios. The name for each category
reflects the state of the DM before the experience is acquired.
Experienced Risk involves situations where each action has a set of known outcomes and the probabilities
are known to the DM. These risks can be experienced to derive a better understanding. An example
of experienced risk would involve a money machine in which each button clearly defined the outcomes
and the probabilities. The machines could be played until the DM is ready to make a final choice.
Experienced Uncertainty involves situations where each action has a set of known outcomes and the
probabilities are unknown. The probability of occurrence can be experienced. An example of experi-
enced uncertainty would involve a money machine in which each button clearly displays all possible
outcomes. The machines could be played to experience the probabilities before making a final choice.
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Figure 1.1: Classification of decision scenarios from description and experience based decision making.
Experienced Enumerated Blank Slate involves situations where the number of possible outcomes is
known, but the value, and probability of occurrence are unknown. Knowledge of the type (value) of
outcome associated with each action can only be learned through experience. An example involves
a money machine which displays the total number of possible outcomes. Discovering the value and
probability associated with each possible outcome can be experienced before making a final choice.
Experienced Enumerated Blank Slate with Probabilities Known involves situations where each a
set of probabilities is known, but the outcomes for which they relate, are unknown and can be experi-
enced. An example involves displaying a partitioning of ambiguous outcomes. The DM may experience
the gambles to identify which outcomes belong to which probabilities.
Experienced Blank Slate involves situations where nothing is known except for the number of actions
which can be chosen. Each action is pre-determined, and static, and knowledge of the outcomes can
only be gained through experience. An example follows the typical method for EBDM in which the
money machine provides no information except experience.
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These categories demonstrate how situations classified as risk and uncertainty can be extended to deci-
sions from experience more directly. The first two categories are direct extensions of risk and uncertainty
with the addition of experience. The addition of experience in uncertainty should naturally lead to more
informed decision makers. The final two categories demonstrate the steps required to extend beyond uncer-
tainty as in the current EBDM paradigm. Each step is based on potentially important changes made to the
decision situation which could impact decisions.
Figure 1.1 displays two continua for situations of description on the left, and experience on the right.
The left hand continuum displays the original decision typology. The marks on the experience continuum
represent the initial state of knowledge for the EBDM categorization. The arrows represent “examples” of
how acquired experience may potentially shift the knowledge state (as well as the categorization). The focus
of previous research has been on the experienced blank slate situation. It is important to note that the
arrow of acquired information emanating from experienced blank slate could point either above or below a
state of uncertainty. Specific types of experiences (e.g., those which involve rare outcomes) may give more
propensity for the arrow to fall in a certain direction. For example, a DM may never see the rare outcome,
and may proceed to make a final decision, knowing that other outcomes may have been possible.
Formulation of theories about (1) how samples are used, (2) how different knowledge states are dealt with,
and (3) the potential impacts of experience will require a review of several psychological theories involving
subjective probability, perceptions of randomness, attitudes toward risk, and decisions under vagueness.
1.5.1 Relevant Theories from Behavioral Decision Making
There are two differences between EBDM and DBDM that are important in understanding why behavior
differs in the two paradigms. The first difference involves the initial state of knowledge. Several theories
that describe the formation of subjective probabilities will help in understanding why behavior differs, as
well as how behavior can be manipulated by different initial states of knowledge. I use support theory
and ignorance priors to demonstrate how different initial knowledge states might impact the formation of
subjective probability estimates in DMs.
The second unique aspect of EBDM involves the impact of experience. In previous research the addition
of experience was confounded with repeated payments (FBDM) and low initial information states. I will
discuss the implications of theories about risk attitude/perception and the role of skill, chance, and luck
on the impact of experience on choices. Experience may prove to alter a DMs behavior because it changes
the relative salience of the information involved in a choice. This experience may allow DMs to see a new
perspective on the risk of a .01 chance of winning, or conversely, the dependability of a .90 chance of a
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winning.
First I develop a theory of how initial information states will impact subsequent choices in EBDM using
support theory and ignorance priors followed by a theory of how experience can influence choices using risk
attitude, definitions of skill, chance, and luck, and finally vagueness.
Support Theory
Support theory provides a useful framework to think about the formation of subjective probability estimates
in the context of EBDM (Tversky & Koehler, 1994; Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997; Sprenger & Dougherty,
2006). I will present an extension of support theory to accommodate scenarios typical of the money machine
paradigm. The application of support theory to EBDM will highlight the need for the refined categorization
of decision making - specifically the difference between counted and uncounted experienced blank slate
decisions.
Let T be a set of states of the world. Subsets of T are defined as events (A′), and descriptions of the
events, are defined as hypotheses (A). This distinction allows multiple hypotheses to describe a single event
A′ ∈ T . A second distinction is between implicit and explicit disjunctions. An explicit disjunction, denoted
A ∨ B can be defined for any two hypotheses. An example of the explicit disjunction, A ∨ B, in EBDM
is given by, “a draw from a three outcome money machine gives 4 or 0.” Here I can define A to be the
outcome 4, and B the outcome 0. An implicit disjunction refers to a hypothesis C that is not elementary
(consisting of only the smallest unit of distinction) and is not an explicit disjunction. An example of an
implicit disjunction, C, in EBDM is given by, “a draw from a three outcome money machine which is not
5.” A money machine which produces the outcomes 0, 4, and 5, can be expressed as C ′ = (A ∨B)′.
An evaluation frame (A,B) consists of a pair of hypotheses, the first one being the focal hypothesis. The
probability of the focal hypothesis is given by,
P (A,B) =
s(A)
s(A) + s(B)
. (1.11)
The hypotheses in the evaluation frame are assumed to be mutually exclusive. I will consider B to be the
alternative hypotheses held by the DM. The function s() is a numeric scale of support for each hypothesis.
The unpacking principle demonstrates subadditivity in probability judgment by unpacking an implicit
disjunction into an explicit disjunction, to highlight the salience of the individual components. The influence
of unpacking can be written as,
s(C) ≤ s(A ∨B) = s(A) + s(B). (1.12)
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This equation shows that increasing the salience of the specific components will increase the support for the
implicit disjuction C.
Sprenger and Dougherty (2006) review a structure of support theory which is relevant to EBDM. Let
the focal hypotheses be denoted as h, and the ith element of the alternative hypothesis be denoted as ¬hi.
Given a total of N elements of the alternative hypothesis, I can compute the probability of h as,
P (h) =
s(h)
s(h) +
∑N
i=1 s(¬hi)
. (1.13)
Limitations of short term memory suggest that not all N alternative hypotheses will be considered when
evaluating the alternative hypothesis as a implicit disjunction of ¬h, resulting in subadditivity of probability
judgment (the sum of probabilities of each element,
∑N
i=1 s(¬hi), is greater than the probability of the
implicit disjunction s(¬h)).
This formulation of support theory can be applied in a slightly different way to account for the under-
weighting of small probabilities in the context of experienced blank slate decision making. Consider the DM
who faces a money machine in which only two outcomes are possible, defined by (x, p; 0, 1−p). The DM has
no information about the underlying process, and must try to identify the process as best as possible. After
the DM is finished with the experience phase, the probability of obtaining x must be assessed. Assume that
the non-zero outcome x is more salient, and resides as the focal hypothesis. The DM can never be certain
that another alternative is possible but has not yet been revealed. This possibility of unknown outcomes
will be denoted as the hypothesis u. The probability of x can be viewed as,
P (x,¬x)⇒ P (x, 0 ∨ u) = s(x)
s(x) + s(0 ∨ u) ≤
s(x)
s(x) + s(0)
(1.14)
Due to the process of experience, it is easy to imagine that a DM would be highly mindful of the fact that
additional outcomes may be possible, thus evoking the evaluation of the probability of x using the explicit
disjunction of ¬x given by 0 ∨ u. In other words, experience triggers an evaluation of using the unpacked
s(0) + s(u) instead of s(¬x) = s(0).
If the DM is accurate in generating support for the outcomes x and 0 based on sample frequencies, it
can easily be seen that P (x) ≤ p for s(u) ≥ 0. In this scenario I predict, more generally, an underestimation
of probabilities, as opposed to under-weighting.
Probability estimation tasks show high accuracy (Hau et al., 2006). The evidence suggests that acting
“as if” under-weighting small probabilities is not caused by inaccurate estimation of the relative proportions
and probabilities. The proposed formulation of support theory could potentially account for this discrepancy
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with enumeration of the outcome space. If a DM is asked to give the probability of obtaining x and 0, there
is no reason to include the support of potential unknown outcomes because the outcome space is completely
enumerated. Complete enumeration could be achieved by having the DM list all possible outcomes (unknown
outcomes can not be listed). This could also occur if DMs are given the complete list of outcomes and asked
to fill in the probabilities. Either of these scenarios can lead to a more accurate representation of the sample
space in the probability estimation phase.
Using support theory I predict that the initial states of knowledge which reveal the total number of
possible outcomes will produce different probability assessments than initial knowledge states where the
outcomes are not enumerated. More specifically, small probabilities will be judged as larger in enumerated
environments than in non-enumerated environments. The distinction between probability estimation and
probability weighting opens the possibility of complex interactions between weighting and estimation. It is
possible that probabilities are over-weighted as in DBDM (or identity weighted), but that the support theory
based underestimation effect is greater, producing what looks like under-weighting of small probability.
Ignorance Priors
Another possible mechanism that can effect probability estimation is an anchor set during the initial state
of knowledge in EBDM. The ability to account for the entire outcome space is important with respect to the
theory of ignorance priors (Fox & Clemen, 2005; See, Fox, & Rottenstreich, 2006). Estimates of probability
have been found to be based on the number of possible outcomes, also referred to as partition dependence.
Ignorance priors act as an initial anchor from which probability estimates are adjusted. Ignorance priors have
explained predictions of systematic overestimation as well as underestimation in decisions under uncertainty.
The manipulation used by See, Fox, and Rottenstreich (2006) provides an example. Participants are
given a scenario where there are two different types of cars available at a dealership, coupes and sedans.
There are 4 different salesmen working at the dealership, only one of which, Carlos, exclusively sells coupes.
Estimates of the probability of a customer purchasing a coupe are influenced by a partitioning of two possible
cars. Estimates of the probability of a customer purchasing a car from Carlos (implying they purchase a
coupe) are influenced by a partitioning of four possible salesmen. Ignorance priors predict that the latter
estimates would be systematically smaller than the estimates based on car model, even though the two
estimates represent the same event.
Enumerated environments in EBDM allow for the manipulation of the total outcome space to make
predictions of both under-weighting as well as over-weighting of small probabilities. In situations were a DM
knows that there are only two possible outcomes, the ignorance prior of 1/2 will serve as the initial anchor.
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This anchor should predict systematic overestimation (or as if over-weighting) of rare events. Conversely,
a DM with no knowledge of the total possible outcomes may imagine any number of possible outcomes,
leading to under-estimation (or as if under-weighting) if the partition of imagined outcomes is greater than
2.
Both support theory and ignorance priors predict different behaviors when the number of possible out-
comes in a gamble are clearly described to the DM. Support theory predicts a more accurate representation
of the objective probabilities, where ignorance priors predict a bias due to insufficient adjustment from the
partition dependent anchor (for binary gambles the anchor is 1/2). Based on the accuracy of EBDM par-
ticipants, it is more likely that support theory will provide the stronger explanation. Ignorance priors will
serve as an alternative explanation for the impact of gamble enumeration on probability estimation.
Risk Attitude
Risk attitude provides a potential explanation for the different choice responses observed in EBDM. Decision
theories such as Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) define functional
forms assumed to underlie the overt choice behaviors. The curvatures of the value and probability weighting
functions predict choices which can be classified as risk seeking, risk aversion, or risk neutral.
EU theory views risk attitude as the curvature of the utility functions, formally u′′(x)/u′(x) known as
the Pratt-Arrow measure (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1971). This measure is based on the first derivative, u′(x),
and second derivative, u′′(x), of the utility function. In general, risk aversion refers to choices in which DMs
will prefer certain equivalents less than the expected value of a gamble. Risk aversion is defined by a concave
utility function: the slope of the function is steep for small values, and diminishes for larger values. Risk
attitude is assessed using probability matching, or certainty equivalents in combination with an assumed
functional form for the utility function (typically, but not restricted to, exponential or power functions).
Risk attitude is more complex for CPT because of the non-linear nature of the probability weighting
function. The combination of the functional forms for CPT generates the four fold pattern of risk attitudes
(see Table 1.1). Under CPT there are two sources that contribute to risk attitude: (1) marginal utility and
(2) probabilistic risk attitude (Wakker, 1994). More than one dimension of risk attitude has been suggested
by many authors (e.g., Dyer & Sarin, 1982; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002; Weber & Milliman, 1997; Qui &
Steiger, 2009; van de Kuilen, 2007; van de Kuilen & Wakker, 2006).
The literature on EBDM shows that the curvature of the weighting function takes on an s-shaped curve
(as opposed to the inverse s-shaped curve from DBDM). This suggests that EBDM provides choice patterns
with reversed attitudes toward risk. For example risk aversion is observed for a low probability of a gain
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instead of risk seeking. A portion of my proposed experiments are designed to test a theory I develop based
on risk perception (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002; Weber & Milliman, 1997) to draw a connection between two
dimensional risk attitude and the changes observed in the choice patterns produced by EBDM. Inconsistency
in choices between EBDM and DBDM is not surprising considering that instability in risk assessment is
pervasive in the study of decision making. Several researchers have tried to identify a consistent underlying
general risk attitude that is stable across multiple domains. I first show an example of how risk perception
is used to justify changes in risk attitude within individuals. I provide an additional example of how risk
assessments can also show stability when assessments are made in a single domain.
Work by Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002) is illustrative of how controlling for risk perception can reveal an
underlying stability within individuals. The authors study risk domain (i.e., financial, health/safety, etc.)
as an important source of inconsistency in risk assessment. Weber, Blais, and Betz model risk attitude using
a risk-return model that combines two sources,
Preference(X) = a(Expected Benefit(X)) + b(Perceived Risk(X)) + c. (1.15)
Expected benefit typically refers to the expected value of the gamble, and the weight a can be linked to
strength of preference defined by Dyer and Sarin (1982). Risk preference refers to the weight b assigned to
perceived risk. The relevance of the two components which are differentially weighted by DMs stems from
the observation (Weber & Milliman, 1997, pg. 129) that “. . . a person’s risk preference may remain the same
over the course of the racing day (e.g., risk averse), but the perception of what constitutes a risky horse will
change.” The results from Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002) suggest that risk preference (parameter b) may
be more stable across different domains than traditional utility based risk attitude measures. In a broader
sense, uncovering a more stable measure of risk attitude across domains supports the idea of risk attitude as
a personality trait relatively stable across time. In a narrower sense, the gambles provided in EBDM have
a different presentation mode that can trigger a refined perception of what is risky and what is not, while
participants can maintain a stable internal risk attitude/preference.
The underlying stability of risk preference can be seen in a study by Sahm (2007) that analyzed risk atti-
tude using data collected from over 12,000 individuals who participated in the University of Michigan Health
and Retirement Study (HRS) surveys from 1992 - 2002. Risk attitude was assessed using a hypothetical
item asking the participants to choose between two new jobs2:
Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family. Your doctor recommends that you
2This is a refined item which was changed in 1998 from a similar item about jobs. In the previous item, the first job is your
current job instead of a new job.
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move because of allergies, and you have to choose between two possible jobs.
The first would guarantee your current total family income for life. The second is possibly better
paying, but the income is also less certain. There is a 50-50 chance the second job would double
your total lifetime income and a 50-50 chance that it would cut it by a third. Which job would
you take - the first job or the second job?
This assessment resides in the domain of lifetime income for all assessments. Removing changes related
to domain (and in theory relating to risk perception) should reveal a more stable measurement. Results
indicate that risk attitudes in the domain of lifetime income appear to be very stable across time even when
events such as health and job threats are taken into account. In fact, those who experience job displacement
are shown to be more risk tolerant suggesting that risk attitude may actually lead to riskier careers with
higher rates of displacement. I conclude that stable risk attitudes exist but are affected by external factors
(e.g., measurement methods or presentation format) that alter the way risks are perceived. EBDM provides
a different presentation format than that provided by DBDM.
I use the term risk behavior to be the observable behavior produced by the combination of the two
components of (1) risk attitude as a stable trait and (2) risk perception as a factor which is less stable and
may be a function of the environment (i.e., the presentation mode of prospect X).
Previous research dealing with risk perception used normative measures of risk attitude as defined by
EUT. I propose to move one step forward and develop the relationship between risk perception and risk
attitude as defined by CPT. I use the framework developed by Wakker (1994) and draw a connection
between risk perception and probabilistic risk attitude (as opposed to marginal utility). This connection
is drawn because probability is the dimension of DBDM that DMs have the least experience with and the
most difficulty in representing objectively. I predict that experiencing a gamble will allow a DM to shift
their perception of the probability of winning more so than their perception of the marginal utility of the
outcome they won.
Several studies discuss the meaning of curvatures for CPT value and weighting functions with respect to
risk attitudes (Qui & Steiger, 2009; van de Kuilen, 2007; van de Kuilen & Wakker, 2006; and Wakker 1994).
Independent elicitation of value and weighting functions is carried out using the “trade off method” (referred
to as TO method) outlined by Wakker and Deneffe (1996). Results suggest that the TO methods provided
utility functions more consistent across domains because the elicitation is independent of probabilities. Qui
and Steiger (2009) use the TO method to study relationships between the curvatures of the value and
weighting functions. They report curvatures of value and weighting functions to be independent of each
other. Additionally, the value function was more stable than the weighting function. The authors suggest
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that the value function may be linked to a stable trait.
van de Kuilen (2007) provided an analysis of subjective probability weighting in the face of experience.
The TO method was used to elicit utility and weighting functions in two experimental conditions. The
participants were told that one of the choices made during the elicitation process will be played at the end
for real money. The control condition required the participants to make choices between the gambles, and
choices were recorded (but not played) to be used for the final payment. The feedback condition allowed
the participants to play each gamble by rolling a die to determine the outcome of the gamble they chose.
Outcomes from their choices were recorded for the final payment. The simple experience of playing the
gamble lead to almost linear weighting functions. This type of experience is different than the experience
in EBDM because each experienced sample will potentially be used as their payment, and each gamble can
only be experienced once. Additionally, van de Kuilen and Wakker (2006) show that this type of experience
leads to choices in the Allais paradox that converge to the predictions EUT. The simplest way to model
this convergence is to shift the weighting function toward linear, and to leave the marginal utility function
unchanged.
This shift in weighting functions is closely related to the fundamental argument of the discovered pref-
erences hypothesis (Plott, 1996; van de Kuilen & Wakker 2006). Plott argues that, “behavior seems to go
through stages of rationality that begin with a type of myopia when faced with unfamiliar tasks. With
incentives and practice, which take the form of repeated decisions in the experimental work . . . the myopia
gives way to what appears to be a stage of more considered choices that reflect stable attitudes of preference”
(Plott, 1996 pg. 248). The ‘incentives’ described by Plot exist in feedback based decision making but not in
EBDM due to the consequence free nature of the experience. The application of the discovered preferences
hypothesis to consequence free experience has yet to be studied. I seek to uncover the cognitive aspects
that, according to Plott, ‘give way’ to more stable attitudes by drawing a connection with research on risk
perception (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002; Weber & Milliman, 1997) and two dimensional perspectives of risk
attitudes (Qui & Steiger, 2009; van de Kuilen, 2007; van de Kuilen & Wakker, 2006; and Wakker 1994).
I predict that experience can produce more objective perceptions of probabilities by altering the DM’s
perception of riskiness, especially for gambles with rare events. This effect is predicted to be interactive,
inflating the perceived risk for gambles with rare success, and reducing the perceived risk for gambles with
rare loss. EBDM will cause a heightened risk perception (paired with reduced risk seeking) compared to
DBDM, for low probability successes, and simultaneously a reduced risk perception (paired with increased
risk seeking) for high probability successes. The impact of EBDM on risk behavior has been supported by
the choices produced by previous studies.
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I suggest that experience in EBDM can alter risk behavior by changing the DMs perception of the
probability of receiving a specific outcome. This aspect of risk perception highlights the connection between
risk perception and probabilistic risk attitude as the perception of the probability of receiving the outcome.
Weber et al. (2002) provide scale based measures of risk perception applicable to both DBDM and EBDM
gambles. Additionally, the TO method proposed by Wakker and Deneffe (1996) can be used for both DBDM
and EBDM gambles. This measure will allow a direct test of the link between risk perception and changes in
the probability weighting function, independent of changes in the value function. Empirical support would
provide evidence for my theory of differential risk perception contributing to the description-experience gap.
Skill, Luck, and Chance
Weber and Milliman (1997, pg. 134) suggest that “an important distinction to be made when examining the
effect of outcome history on risky decisions is whether task performance is perceived to be determined by
chance or by skill.” Choosing between two fully described gambles highlights skill in choice, and downplays
the chance involved in playing the chosen gamble. Experience may serve to remind a DM of the chance
component involved in playing a risky gamble. The heightened salience of the chance dimension may make
DMs more risk averse, serving as a reminder of the lack of control of a chance situation.
There is an interesting distinction between chance and luck (Wagenaar & Keren, 1988). The authors
discuss how chance and luck can actually be viewed as causes of random outcomes. One popular example
of how chance can erroneously be viewed as a cause is given by the gambler’s fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman
1974) - The DMs will attribute fairness and memory to a coin, even when they know that each random
outcome is independent of the last. If a DM sees several coin flips which produce heads, they will believe a
tails is due.
This analysis of chance, skill, and luck suggests that heightened perception of chance should lead to more
risk adverse behavior, whereas heightened perception of skill should lead to risk seeking. In the context-free
environment of the money machine the perception of chance appears to be the most salient; predicting that
subjects should tend to be more risk averse in the experience paradigm than in the description paradigm.
This assertion can be tested with an assessment of value functions using the methods outlined above in the
risk aversion section.
Vagueness (Ambiguity)
Most studies of decision making under vagueness (also known as ambiguity) follow a description based
design. Typically a DM is aware of the parameters from which a gamble will follow, except that some of the
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parameters are either missing, or partially known. There are many regularities to the behavior of DMs who
are exposed to vagueness. Ellsberg (1961) predicted avoidance of vague gambles.
The initial state of an experienced uncertainty scenario is a state of uncertainty, and with each additional
experience, a DM obtains more information about each gamble. After several draws one could conclude that
the DM has a vague idea of the properties associated with each gamble. If a DM is averse to vagueness, then
one might predict that they would draw a nearly infinite number of times in order to obtain information
which leads them closer to a decision under risk (those associated with description).
Fox and Tversky (1991) investigate the role of comparative ignorance on ambiguity aversion (i.e., vague-
ness aversion). The comparative ignorance hypothesis states that ambiguity aversion is driven by comparison
with prospects which are more clearly defined. In EBDM, both prospects have the same amount of vague-
ness, therefore, the comparative ignorance hypothesis predicts, correctly, that DMs do not take long searches
in order to avoid vagueness.
Work on perceptions of vagueness show that vague probabilities are perceived differently than vague
outcomes (Budescu et al. 2002). Budescu and Templin (2008) report that: “concern for the precision of an
attribute may be related to its relative salience in the decision process.” In EBDM this would imply that
the salience of outcomes is heightened by the money machine paradigm. This would occur because outcomes
are the only information DMs are given, and probabilities must be inferred from the outcomes. Budescu
et al. (2002) show a higher concern for the precision of outcomes than probabilities and vagueness seeking
(avoidance) for positive (negative) outcomes. These empirical results are explained by suggesting that the
DMs focus on the relevant end points of the vague interval (e.g., the highest possible gain and lowest possible
loss). In the EBDM paradigm, DMs are not aware of how many different types of outcomes are possible
and may treat the known outcomes as vague intervals. The changes in salience between probabilities and
outcomes invoked by EBDM may contribute to the differences in behavior.
In conclusion, research on vagueness would support a theory that DMs might not feel averse to relatively
small samples because there is no standard for comparison, and that probabilities may play a smaller role
than previously thought. The money machine design displays only outcomes, changing the relative salience
of probabilities and outcomes might induce changes in behavior that can explain the experience-description
gap.
The connection between research on vagueness and EBDM is related to the fact that neither provides a
full description of the options. Vagueness research typically uses a description based paradigm where some
of the properties of the gamble are not specifically defined (or known). These types of decisions can be
classified as being on a continuum between risk and uncertainty. This weak connection allows insight into
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how DMs react to incomplete descriptions, but should not be assumed to generalize to EBDM.
1.6 New Contributions to the Study of EBDM of the Proposed
Research
1.6.1 Normative Models of Information Search in an Enumerated
Environment
I construct three normative models for information search that could be considered normative. The models
predict the number of draws required to reach a pre-determined level of accuracy. Assuming that all experi-
enced samples will be from a binomial distribution, I devise rules to sample from the distributions, stop at
a certain point, and make a final choice. The normative models estimate the probability p of the occurrence
of one (the highest) outcome. Second, the probability is combined with the outcomes through SEU theory,
where the subjective probability is the probability which is estimated from the experienced outcomes.
Bayesian Inference Approach
The first model for estimating the probability p is a Bayesian updating rule. Let x be the number of successes,
y be the number of failures, and let p be the probability of a success for the binomial distribution given by,
p(x|N, p) =
(
N
x
)
px(1− p)N−x. (1.16)
Assume a prior probability distribution for p given by a Beta distribution,
pi(p|α, β) = pα−1(1− p)β−1 1
B(α, β)
. (1.17)
Update the distribution of p by using the samples from the money machine,
p(p|x) ∝ p(x|p) ∗ pi(p|α, β). (1.18)
The beta distribution is a conjugate prior of the binomial distribution, and the posterior distribution is also
a beta distribution where each success adds to α and each failure adds to β giving,
p(p|x, y) ∝ pα−1+x(1− p)β−1+y ∗ const. (1.19)
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Figure 1.2: Bayesian inference threshold cutoff based on the number of samples experienced.
Assume a uniform prior α = 1 and β = 1 to get the following simplified form for the distribution of the
parameter p,
p(p|x, y) ∝ px−1(1− p)y−1 ∗ const = beta(x+ 1, y + 1). (1.20)
To simplify the following expressions let a = x + 1 and b = y + 1. The mean and variance of the posterior
distribution for the parameter p is given by,
E(p) =
a
a+ b
, and V ar(p) =
ab
(a+ b)2(a+ b+ 1)
. (1.21)
I estimate the parameter p as the E(p) when the variance of this distribution is below a threshold vbayes
such that V ar(p) < vbayes. Varying this threshold will change the overall amount of information which is
gathered before estimating the subjective probability based on the experienced sequence of outcomes.
Given a value for vbayes, the samples required for termination are well defined. Figure 1.2 outlines the
required values for a and b for vbayes = 0.005, 0.01, and 0.015.
Coefficient of Variation Approach
The coefficient of variation is defined as the ratio of the variance and the squared mean, denoted CV = σ2/µ2.
A second method for assessing the amount of information to search for is to set a threshold on the width of
an approximate vCV percent confidence interval based on the coefficient of variation for the estimate of the
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Figure 1.3: CV threshold cutoff based on the number of samples experienced.
parameter p as defined above. The confidence interval defined as,
pˆ± 2
√
p(1− p)
N
(1.22)
can be set to have required width. I can set a value vCV such that the width of the confidence interval
relative to the estimate be at most vCV . In other words,
2
√
p(1− p)
N
≤ vCV ∗max{pˆ, (1− pˆ)}. (1.23)
In this case I would use the estimate pˆ along with the current number of experienced samples to compute
the width of the confidence interval. After each trial the width can be computed, and compared to the
value of vCV to determine if sampling should stop. Figure 1.3 outlines the required number of successes and
failures for vCV = 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5.
Variance Approach
I can apply the method above to the variance of the binomial distribution instead of the CV. This requires
a cutoff vV AR for the variance,
2
√
p(1− p)
N
≤ vV AR. (1.24)
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Figure 1.4: Variance threshold cutoff based on the number of samples experienced.
Each of the normative models presented above can be used to test if attention to probability estimation
is affected by different information states. Figure 1.4 outlines the required number of successes and failures
for vV AR = 0.15, 0.2, and 0.25.
1.6.2 Characterization of Information Search
The second contribution to the study of EBDM is a more detailed analysis of the pre-decision sampled
experiences. The sampled experiences allow the DM to perform self guided searches in the presence of two
prospects. DMs can either focus on one prospect at a time, switch after each experience, or some other
variation in between. This section provides insight into how switching behavior is helpful in understanding
the processes that take place when confronting a money machine based task.
Switching Behavior
Switches can act as a point of relative assessment between the gambles. Each switch breaks the experienced
sample down into more manageable parts. Motivations for switching are not provided by any of the models
considered in the literature (e.g., natural mean, CPT, and maximax), so removal of switches has no effect
on either model’s predictions. I argue that switching is required to implement simplifying heuristics that rely
on direct comparison of smaller portions of the information search.
I provide a brief analysis of the Hertwig et al. (2004) data to demonstrate some of the properties of the
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Table 1.6: Percent of DMs in Hertwig et al. (2004) categorized in each group (N = 150 search sequences).
Search Type Lower quartile Median
Short 0.24 0.46
Systematic 0.25 0.50
Random 0.31 0.31
Other 0.50 0.35
switches. All the gambles in this data set are dichotomous containing a high and a low outcome. I grouped
the subjects based on the properties of their experienced samples. Three groups are defined as: (1) short
searches, (2) systematic searches, and (3) random searches. Subjects are classified in the short search group
if the search length is extremely short. Subjects are classified in the systematic search group if the standard
deviation of the length of the runs is very low (they search in a systematic and repetitive pattern). Finally
subjects are classified in the random search group by comparing the distribution of the runs in their search
with a random binomial distribution using the Wald-Wolfowitz runs test. Subjects are assigned to these
groups by evaluating each of these traits separately, so some subjects can be classified into more than one
group.
In the absence of an objective definition of “short” or “systematic” I use quantile cut-offs to assign
subjects to groups. I report results using two thresholds - median and the 25th quantile (labeled lower
quartile). The column labeled median contains subjects who scored in the lower 50% on the given search
trait (i.e., either short or systematic). The column labeled lower quartile contains subjects who scored in the
lower 25% on the given search trait (i.e., either short or systematic). The group of interest, other, consists
of the DMs who do not utilize short, systematic, or random searches.
The analysis is performed using three sets of groupings: (1) across all subjects, (2) across groupings
defined by the lower quartile, and (3) across groupings defined by the median. The percent of subjects
classified into each group is displayed in Table 1.6. The median classification provides a lenient boundary
for being classified as short or systematic. The grouping associated with the median produces a smaller
number of DMs in the other group than for the lower quartile split. I will look at the analysis in terms of
all subjects being the least restrictive (100% DMs retained), followed by the lower quartile group (50% DMs
retained as other), and the median group being the most restrictive (35% DMs retained as other).
The switches and repeated plays are tallied across all sampled experience by all participants in the Hertwig
et al. (2004) data set for each of the grouping methods. Table 1.7 shows that repeated samples are more
frequent than switches and that the probability of switching appears to be unrelated to the previous outcome
in all three grouping conditions. There is a stronger association as the groups become more restricted, with
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Table 1.7: Frequency of switches and repeat samples in Hertwig et al. (2004) given the value of the previous
experience.
All Lower quartile Median
High Low Total High Low Total High Low Total
Repeat 1153 1103 2256 953 919 1872 829 798 1627
Switch 433 418 851 191 216 407 117 86 203
Total 1586 1521 3107 1144 1135 2279 946 884 1830
Statistic DF Value Prob DF Value Prob DF Value Prob
Chi-Square 1 0.01 0.91 1 2.12 0.15 1 3.23 0.07
Table 1.8: Hertwig et al. (2004) frequency of switches and repeats for the final choice.
All Lower quartile Median
Repeat 86 41 29
Switch 64 34 23
Total 150 75 52
Table 1.9: Hertwig et al. (2004) switching rates for the learning stage and for the final choice.
All Lower quartile Median
Learning 0.27 0.18 0.11
Final 0.43 0.45 0.44
the median group producing the highest chi-square statistic (with the lowest number of observations).
Table 1.8 shows the number of switches occurring between the last gamble experienced in the learning
phase and the final choice. The results show an almost equal tendency to choose the last gamble experienced
(repeat) or switch when transitioning from the learning phase to the final choice. Table 1.9 compares the
switching rates occurring within the learning stage with the switching rate for the transition to the final
choice. The number of switches is larger for final choices than the number observed within the learning
stage. The probability of switching given final choice is not statistically different from 0.50 by a two tailed
binomial test for any of the groups. The probability of switching within the learning phase is significantly
lower than 0.50 by binomial test p < .001 for all groups.
In conclusion, the current analysis suggests that switching is probably not caused by a reaction to the
outcomes received from the gambles. When making the final choice, DMs tend to switch almost 50% of the
time, implying that termination of the experience phase is not determined by the most recently experienced
gamble. I aim to show that switches within the experienced samples are linked to processes that depend on
aspects of EBDM like initial information states and probability estimation.
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1.6.3 New Behavioral Models of Information Search
The goal for EBDM choices is to choose the gamble that will provide the best one-shot payoff. I develop
several models that may be advantageous in an environment a DM may feel is too complex to understand
completely.
Contrast Effects
“Adaptation and loss aversion lead to a preference for improving sequences because people tend to adapt to
ongoing stimuli over time and evaluate new stimuli relative to their adaptation level.”
- Loewenstein and Prelec from Choices, Values, and Frames pg. 568.
The contrast effect is based on the PT gain/loss distinction. CPT states that DMs evaluate every
decision they face relative to a neutral reference point. Many studies have looked at reference points and
their influence on human decision making (Tversky & Kahneman 1991; Thaler 1999; Arkes, Hirshleifer,
Jiang, & Lim 2007) and how it can be used to explain different behaviors.
Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) distinguish between positive time discounting and negative time preference.
Positive time discounting states that outcomes which occur further in the future are valued less. This predicts
counter intuitive behaviors such as preferences for declining salary over time. Negative time preference
predicts that DM would prefer a series of events which improve over time. An important aspect of the
decision scenario which may trigger negative time preference is knowledge that the decisions are made
sequentially.
One important aspect of an improving sequence of events is that from one event to the next, the DM will
experience a positive contrast meaning that each step represents an improvement. This idea is summarized
perfectly by Loewenstein and Prelec (1993), “. . . Inferior early experiences will create a favorable contrast
that will enhance the utility of later experiences.” A DM chooses gambles sequentially, and may adapt (or
induce ownership) to the outcomes they experience.
EBDM Contrast Model of Choice
This model is based on the contrast effect, and is aimed at modeling the interaction between the sequence
of the choices with the outcomes over time. The contrast model predicts that choices are determined in part
by the random path taken during the experience stage. This implies that preference is determined by the
random outcomes realized, and the switches invoked by the DM. The contrast model cannot predict when
switches will occur (run length is assumed to depend on short term memory restraints) nor how long the
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search will be. Previous research has shown that total search length can depend on external factors such as
payoff magnitude.
Let a DM’s experience of two gambles A ∼ (x1, pA;x2, qA) and B ∼ (y1, pB ; y2, qB) be given by the
following two series of observed outcomes,
Choice: A, A, A, B, B, A, A, A, A, B, B, B
Payoff: x1, x2, x2, y1, y1, x2, x1, x1, x1, y1, y1, y2.
I define each change from A to B (or B to A) in the choice data as a switch, and the total number of
switches will be denoted Ns. In the above series, there are Ns = 3 switches. Each of these switches will be
assigned a contrast value CAi or CBj . CAi is the contrast of the i
th switch from A to B. Similarly CBj is
the contrast of the jth switch from B to A. The indices i and j alternate in counting the switches such that
i 6= j and 0 < i, j ≤ N . The simplest computation of contrast CAi is the difference between the function
g of observed payoffs from gamble A before the switch, g(XAi), and the function g of the payoffs from the
gamble B after the switch g(YBi):
CAi = g(XAi)− g(YBi) and respectively CBj = g(YBj)− g(XAj). (1.25)
The choice between gambles A and B will be based on a function of the contrasts such that: If f(CAi) >
f(CBj) the DM chooses gamble A, and if f(CAi) < f(CBj) the DM chooses gamble B. In the analysis
provided below, the functions f and g are the arithmetic averages, but they could be replaced by other
functions - f could be the minimum, maximum, most recent, etc. One could also incorporate order effects
by differentially weighting the contrasts relative to their position in the sequence.
If both functions g and f are the means, the first contrast is CA1 = (x1 + x2 + x2)/3− (y1 + y1)/2. The
second contrast is CB2 = (y1 + y1)/2 − (x2 + x1 + x1 + x1)/4. Then I compare the average of f(CAi) =
(CA1+CA3)/2 and f(CBj) = (CB2)/1 to make a final choice. Notice that the number of contrasts for gamble
A and B are not equal. In this example, gamble A has two contrasts, and gamble B has one contrast. If
there is only one switch, then only one of the gambles has a defined contrast. In this case, this contrast would
be compared to the number zero, so that only the sign of the contrast is important. If f(CAi) = f(CBj) an
option is chosen randomly.
To simplify the model even further, let the f be an indicator function which signals which gamble
performed better. In this way, a DM could keep track of multiple comparisons in an un-weighted fashion. I
will refer to this version of the contrast model as Contrast Indicator (Dawes, 1979) because it is based on
only finding direction of support, and not the weights.
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A second way to utilize the search sequence is to choose the gamble with the higher probability to produce
an outcome higher than the outcome of the other gamble. In other words, let gambles X and Y be sampled
as before,
Choice: X, X, X, Y, Y, X, X, X, X, Y, Y, Y
Payoff: x1, x2, x2, y1, y1, x2, x1, x1, x1, y1, y1, y2.
Using these samples I can produce the probability that X > Y , P (X > Y ). Let the relative frequencies
of the above samples be estimates of P (x1), P (x2), P (y1), and P (y2). I define the joint probabilities as the
product of probabilities under independence such that P (xi&yj) = P (xi)P (yj) for each combination of i
and j.
The probability of obtaining the best outcome depends on the relationship between the values of the
outcomes. In the above example, assuming that x1 > y1 > x2 > y2, then I produce the following probabilities,
P (X > Y ) = P (x1&y1) + P (x1&y2) + P (x2&y2) = 16/35 + 4/35 + 3/25 = 23/35
P (X < Y ) = P (x2&y1) = 12/35.
The decision rule is to choose the gamble with the higher probability of producing the highest outcome. In
this example, the model would choose gamble X since P (X > Y ) > P (X < Y ).
1.6.4 Comparison of Behavioral Models - Prediction for Hertwig et al. (2004)
I compared maximax, the natural mean heuristic, and CPT with Tversky and Kahneman (1991) parameters
reported as the three best models by Hau et at. (2006). Three additional new models include maximum
probability (MaxProb), and two variants of the contrast model. The contrast indicator (Contrast Ind) model
provides indications of which gamble is better for each contrast. The contrast average model uses simple
averages to compute contrast value. Table 1.10 shows the overall correct prediction rate for each of the
models. The highest performing models are the contrast, natural mean, and maximum probability. There
is a close similarity between the contrast model and the natural mean model (both are based on averages of
the sample outcomes), but the predictions are not identical for all cases.
The analysis of these six models is refined to examine how the models perform in situations where each
model makes a different prediction. Table 1.11 displays the percent of identical predictions made by each
pair of models. Models with high levels of overlap may be due to obvious cases where all models make
the same prediction. In fact, in the Hertwig et al. (2004) data set all 6 models provide the same correct
predictions in 44% of the observations (a total of 48% identical predictions from all 6 models). Almost
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Table 1.10: Percent correct predictions for the top three previously tested decision models compared to the
new contrast and maximum probability models using Hertwig et al. (2004) data set.
Model Percent Correct
Maximax 0.73
Nat. Mean 0.79
CPT-TK 0.68
MaxProb 0.78
Cntrast Ind. 0.84
Cntrast 0.82
Table 1.11: Percent of identical predictions between each pair of decision models.
% overlap Maximax Nat. Mean CPT-TK MaxProb Cntrast Ind Cntrast GM
Maximax - 0.68 0.75 0.67 0.72 0.70 0.70
Nat. Mean 0.68 - 0.74 0.78 0.93 0.97 0.81
CPT-TK 0.75 0.74 - 0.51 0.67 0.72 0.67
MaxProb 0.67 0.78 0.51 - 0.87 0.79 0.71
Cntrast Ind 0.72 0.93 0.67 0.87 - 0.95 0.82
Cntrast 0.70 0.97 0.72 0.79 0.95 - 0.82
half of the trials produce trivial cases where all models predict the same. Table 1.11 shows that CPT-TK
and MaxProb have the lowest rate of identical predictions. Additionally, CPT-TK has the lowest average
overlap rate with the other models. These results show an extremely high overlap between the natural mean,
contrast, and contrast indicator models. These three models appear to capture very similar features of the
search patterns.
Table 1.12 displays a pair-wise comparison of the six models based only on the cases where they make
distinct predictions. Each entry in the matrix is defined by a ratio of the number of correct predictions of
the row model over the number of correct predictions of the column model. Values greater than 1 show more
correct predictions for the row model. The contrast indicator model is the winner. In cases were contrast
indicator makes a prediction differing from any of the other 5 models, it is correct on average twice as often
as any of the competing models. The bottom half of Table 1.12 shows the number of independent predictions
for all pairs of models. Each cell provides the number of predictions of the row model when compared with
the column model. This matrix is not symmetric because some models cannot make a prediction based on
certain experienced samples.
This analysis provides insight into the heuristics used by DMs in EBDM. Within this set of competing
models, the CPT-TK two stage model makes predictions that differ from the other 5 non-utility based
decision models. There are a large number of trivial cases (44% of the choices) that are correctly predicted
by all 6 models. The contrast model and the natural mean provide correct predictions more often than
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Table 1.12: Number of choices favoring the row divided by number of choices favoring column for the subset
of unique predictions.
Number favoring row over number favoring column
Maximax Nat. Mean CPT-TK MaxProb Cntrast Ind Cntrast GM
Maximax - 0.72 1.54 0.76 0.54 0.60 0.74
Nat. Mean 1.39 - 2.27 1.07 0.50 0.25 1.20
CPT-TK 0.65 0.44 - 0.67 0.41 0.37 0.50
MaxProb 1.32 0.93 1.50 - 0.56 0.76 1.07
Cntrast Ind 1.87 2.00 2.43 1.78 - 1.43 1.98
Cntrast 1.67 4.00 2.70 1.31 0.70 - 1.69
Number of unique predictions made by row model
Maximax Nat. Mean CPT-TK MaxProb Cntrast Ind Cntrast
Maximax - 44 33 44 44 42
Nat Mean 42 - 34 29 17 6
CPTKT 33 36 - 65 49 39
MaxProb 43 30 64 - 25 30
CountD 41 16 46 23 - 15
Count 39 5 36 28 15 -
the competing models when considering the cases where the models make (pairwise) unique predictions.
Maximax and CPT-TK look competitive in Table 1.10 for overall correct predictions, but are shown to be
inferior when considering the difficult cases.
1.7 Summary
I indentify initial information states as a key element of EBDM. The initial information state in EBDM
provides much less information than the typical DBDM experiment and may contribute to the experience-
description gap. Low initial information states may trigger DMs to use non-probability based heuristics to
simplify the task. Several theories can potentially explain why information states might change subsequent
choices.
In previous studies experience was only provided to DMs in a low initial information state. Experience
obtained in higher information states may show more clearly the impact of experience on decisions. I
have developed several predictions about how experience may influence choices based on risk perception,
vagueness, and the salience of chance in risky choice. The experience derived from a gamble may change
the relative salience of the components that make up the gambles. These changes can potentially produce
systematic changes in choice (when controlling for initial information states).
The proposed experiments and analyses build on the EBDM literature by providing a replication of
previous findings in combination with adding measures of risk perception and manipulating the initial
information states. I also incorporate the use of certain equivalents to more closely look at the weighting
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functions produced by choices from EBDM.
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Chapter 2
Experimental Tests
Several studies on EBDM started with decisions in experienced blank slate skipping over several of the
categories presented earlier. Experienced blank slate is not equivalent to risk or uncertainty because the
two decision scenarios provide different amounts of information. Experiencing a gamble may not produce
as complete an understanding as achieved in states of risk given the low initial information state typically
paired with EBDM. I hypothesize that this discrepancy explains much of the experience-description gap
(Hau, et al. 2008). Several demonstrations of the importance of initial information states have recently been
published (Erev, Glozman, & Hertwig, 2008; Hadar & Fox, 2009).
In the method section I first present the design of the experiment involving several conditions manipulat-
ing the experience, initial information states, and final goals. For each of these manipulations I outline the
predicted results. Next I present a detailed experimental procedure followed by the results and discussion
sections.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Design
The focus of this work is on three different initial information states in EBDM. I begin by defining the
experimental conditions used in testing a majority of the predictions.
• Risk - written summaries of the gambles.
• Experienced Risk - written summaries of the gambles identical to risk with the addition of a money
machine that produces outcomes when triggered.
• Enumerated Experience - descriptions of the number of possible outcomes for each money machine.
• Experienced Blank Slate - a money machine with no additional information.
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Table 2.1: List of 10 pairs of gambles used in the experiment and their expected value.
Problem Gamble A Gamble B EV(A) EV(B) Description
1 (4,.8) (3,1) 3.2 3 Common Ratio
2 (4,.2) (3,.25) 0.8 0.75 Effect Pair 1
3 (32,.1) (3,1) 3.2 3 Common Ratio
4 (32,.025) (3,.25) 0.8 0.75 Effect Pair 2
5 (6,.4; 2,.4) (3,1) 3.20 3.00 3 outcome 1
6 (6,.1; 2,.1) (3,.25) 0.8 0.75 3 outcome 2
7 (4,.6) (3,.75) 2.4 2.25 Subadditivity 1
8 (4,.4) (3,.5) 1.6 1.5 Subadditivity 2
9 (4,.8) (6,.5) 3.2 3 Probability 1
10 (6,.5) (4,.6) 3 2.4 Probability 2
The risk condition serves as a control group and it is the typical DBDM paradigm from which CPT was
developed. The remaining conditions are listed in order of decreasing initial information states. Experienced
risk involves a complete gamble description (identical to risk) complemented with an opportunity to expe-
rience. Enumerated experience involves a limited description of the gamble (identifying the total number of
possible outcomes) complemented by an opportunity to experience. Finally, experienced blank slate follows
the typical EBDM paradigm where only experience is offered.
Research Hypotheses
The predictions are organized into 3 classes: predictions about (1) the impact of experience on weighting
functions and risk perception, (2) the impact of information states on choices and decision strategies, (3)
the influence of goal setting on the search process.
The experiment involves several tasks and extracts different measures from DMs. The first task requires
choices between pairs of gambles considered simultaneously (displayed in Table 2.1); in the experience based
groups, experience is obtained in the presence of both choices. In addition DMs evaluate each of the
prospects individually by providing CEs that are used to estimate the CPT probability weighting functions.
This task is complemented with measures of perceived risk of each prospect presented individually. The final
measurement uses a description based method (for all groups) to evaluate value functions using equivalences
between two prospects (similar to a CE).
Predictions about the impact of experience on weighting functions and risk perception
Hypothesis 1. Experience influences (1) the curvature of the weighting function and (2) the perception of
risk.
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Weighting Functions: I predict experience to reduce the curvature of the weighting functions (toward
identity). These predictions are based on results from several studies using a feedback based design (i.e.,
feedback as payment after each experience). A single parameter summarizing the curvature of each weighting
function is estimated from the CEs provided by each individual based on the Prelec I weighting function
(Prelec 1998). The parameters obtained from each group are compared in a one factor between subjects
design (risk, experienced risk, enumerated experience, and experienced blank slate).
Value functions are elicited at the individual level to assist in the estimation of weighting functions using
a DBDM paradigm. Previous exposure to the various types of experiences may impact value functions as
well. Single parameter summaries of value functions (based on the power function) are also tested using the
same design previously described for the weighting functions.
Perceived Risk : I predict that experience causes systematic differences in risk perception. This prediction
is based on my hypothesized connection between risk perception and changes in the probability weighting
function. The rating scale for risk perception focuses on risk as the perception of obtaining the bad outcome
(see Appendix B).
The analysis of risk perception depends on the probabilities associated with the failures and successes of
each gamble. I predict that gambles with low probabilities of success (failure) will show increased (reduced)
risk perception with exposure to experience when compared to DBDM. For example, if a gamble promises $32
with probability p = 0.1 and $0 otherwise, the DBDM group will rate its risk lower because the probability
weighting function will overweight the rare success, producing reduced risk perception (i.e., reducing the
perception of obtaining the $0 outcome). On the other hand, if a gamble promises $4 with probability p = 0.8
and $0 otherwise, the DBDM group will rate its risk higher because the probability weighting function will
underweight the large probability of success (and overweight the probability of the $0 outcome), producing
heightened risk perception (i.e., raising the perception of obtaining the $0 outcome).
I expect systematic differences between the DBDM group, and the remaining EBDM groups. The
predictions regarding perceived risk is tested using a two factor (one between subjects and one within
subjects) design. The within subjects factor is the magnitude of the probability of success. This factor
requires the identification of each gamble as belonging to rare success or rare failure groups. The between
subjects factor is the group assignment (description condition vs. experience conditions). The two factors
are predicted to interact where (1) rare success increases risk perception with the addition of experience and
(2) rare failures reduces risk perception with the addition of experience.
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Predictions about the impact of information states on choices and decision strategies
Hypothesis 2. Experience Different initial information states lead to different choice patterns because of
different decision (and estimation) strategies in combination with the weighting functions discussed above.
I predict that the experienced blank slate triggers non SEUT/CPT decision strategies. Probability may
play a smaller role in an unknown environment because DMs have difficulty summarizing and understanding
the prospects. I predict that enumeration of the environment will trigger more reliance on CPT based
models. Once the DMs know how many outcomes are possible, the task of assigning probabilities should
become much easier (especially when they know there are only 2 outcomes) because they do not need to be
concerned with discovering outcomes which have not yet been revealed.
Choices: Each of the groups, defined by initial information state, is linked to a specific weighting function
shape. The description based group is predicted to provide choice proportions consistent with an inverse
S shaped weighting function. Experienced risk is predicted to show choice proportions which most closely
resemble the risk (description) group, but with more linear weighting functions (due to experience).
Predictions for the enumerated experience group are drawn from two different theories of probability
estimation. The application of Support Theory to probability estimation in EBDM shows the importance
of an enumerated environment. When all outcomes are known then s(u) = 0 implying probability estimates
consistent with the relative frequencies in the sampled experience. Otherwise, the support reserved for
unknown potential outcomes causes underestimation of probability. The estimates will then be subject to
the probability weighting function (which is predicted to be close to linear based on the previous hypothesis).
The second set of predictions for enumerated experience is based on ignorance priors (Fox & Clemen, 2005;
See, Fox, & Rottenstreich, 2006). These priors predict that the binomial (trinomial) gambles will induce an
anchor of 1/2 (1/3) for forming estimates of probabilities. These estimates, if insufficiently adjusted, cause
systematic over (under) estimation of small (large) probabilities. If these estimates are combined with a
linear (or even inverse-S shaped) weighting function, choice should be consistent with those produced by an
inverse-S shaped weighting function.
Finally, experienced blank slate is predicted to provide choice proportions consistent with under-weighting
of small probabilities (S shaped weighting function) as revealed by previous EBDM studies. There are two
potential explanations for these choice patterns: This pattern of choices is consistent with support theory
as described above. If I include support for a potentially unknown outcome into the support function, I
predict underestimation of rare events. The second explanation put forth by Fox and Hadar (2004) is based
on statistical properties of the binomial distribution: The small samples collected by DMs under represent
rare events. These two explanations provide different predictions for enumerated experience: (1) support
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theory will predict more accurate estimation when s(u) = 0 leading to choices as if linear weighting or over
weighting small probabilities; (2) the statistical properties of small samples will not change with enumerated
experience. The impact of information states is tested in a one factor between subjects design with the four
groups described above.
Tests of probability sensitivity are carried out using choice proportions for gamble pairs 9 and 10. The
predicted choice is invariant across the 3 types of weighting functions aligning the predictions of CPT with
expected value maximization. The DMs are expected to show high choice proportions of gamble A in both
gamble pairs with the following exception. I predict that in pair 9 DMs in experience blank slate will not
choose the gamble with the higher expected value because this gamble offers a lower positive outcome (i.e.,
EV (4, 0.80) > EV (6, 0.50) and 4 < 6).
Properties of the Samples Experienced : Analyses of the sampled experience can also reveal the impact of
different information states. Properties of sampled experience will change depending on initial information
states because of differences in what the DM is attempting to learn. Switches (between the gambles in a
pair) are identified as an important aspect of experiencing gambles, serving to break up information and aid
in the use of heuristic decision strategies.
I expect the experienced risk group to have the smallest samples because there is no new information
to obtain. There are no predictions about the use of switches for this group. I expect that the enumerated
experience group will estimate probabilities, and as a result, the sample size is predicted to be the largest and
switches are predicted to be minimal (switches are not functional for probability estimation). Experienced
blank slate is predicted to hinder probability estimation, and as a result the sample size is predicted to be
smaller than enumerated experience and the number of switches is predicted to be maximal.
Summaries of experience such as (1) total sample length, (2) probability estimation error (based on nor-
mative statistical models), and (3) frequency (and variance) of switching behavior are analyzed by comparing
only the experience groups.
Decision Models: An additional test of the impact of information states will be conducted by using a
variety of decision models to predict the final choices based on the experienced samples. Predictions are based
on how information about probability is utilized by the DM. I predict that experienced risk and enumerated
decision environments favor models based on CPT. I predict experienced blank slate to favor alternative
models that do not focus on probability estimation (e.g., maximax, natural mean, and the contrast models).
A preliminary comparison of decision models for the data set from Hertwig et al. (2004) is presented in
Section 1.6.4.
Confidence and Difficulty : I hypothesize that confidence (difficulty) will be lower (higher) in decision
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categories which provide less information (i.e., experience blank slate).
The impact of the final goal on experience and choices
Hypothesis 3. Changing the DM’s goals / incentives by rewarding accurate probability estimation will
influence the search patterns, and in turn, final choices.
Properties of the Sampled Experience: Significant changes in search patterns (switches and sample size)
can provide evidence that probabilities are not estimated in experienced blank slate with a one-shot play.
A second experiment was designed to test the predicted effect of goal change. Two groups based on
enumerated experience and experienced blank slate with incentives for accurate probability estimates (instead
of gamble choice) were added. The design involves a 2 x 2 between subjects, repeated measures: one factor
is defined by 2 levels of initial information state (enumerated experienced or experienced blank slate) and
the other factor is defined by incentive structure (one shot play or probability estimation). The DVs are (1)
choices, (2) weighting functions, (3) total sample length, (4) probability estimation error, and (5) frequency
(and variance) of switching behavior.
2.1.2 Experiment 1: Tests of information states and the impacts of experience
H1 and H2
Participants
Participants included 103 volunteers (mean age = 21; 66% female) who either responded to an advert for a
paid decision making experiment.
Procedure
Participants were run on computers in the lab through a web based experimental interface. They read and
signed informed consent forms before the experiment. Instructions informed each participant about a series
of choices (see Appendix A). Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four groups - risk, experienced
risk, enumerated experience, and experienced blank slate. Each participant faced gamble pairs presented in
different formats based on the condition assignment:
• Risk - written summaries of the gambles (or the use of outcomes and a probability spinner).
• Experienced Risk - written summaries of the gambles identical to risk with the addition of a money
machine which will produce outcomes when triggered;
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Figure 2.1: Flow chart of the experimental procedure.
Gamble Pair is 
Randomly Selected.
Depending on Group:
Experience Obtained in the 
face of both gambles.
E.g., Red and Blue Gambles
A gamble is 
chosen -
Choice 
Recorded
Difficulty and 
Confidence 
are Rated
One gamble (Red or Blue) 
from the pair is randomly 
chosen for CE elicitation
Risk Perception is Rated
(Repeat for pair)
Repeat for all gamble pairs 
Phase 1 : Gamble Choice and CE
Phase 2: Value Function Elicitation
Trade-off method is used for 
elicitation of value function.
All groups use Descriptions.
Elicit Equivalence relations 
between pairs of gambles. 
Exit Questions and Payment
• Enumerated Experience - descriptions of the number of possible outcomes with a money machine;
• Experienced Blank Slate - a money machine with no information.
The experiment consists of two phases. The experimental manipulation defined by the group assignment
pertains only to phase 1; phase 2 is the same for all conditions. Figure 2.1 presents a flow chart for the tasks
each participant faced.
Phase 1 : The first phase of the experiment consisted of two types of choices in the following order: (1)
choices between pairs of gambles presented in Table 2.1 and (2) choices between each gamble in the pair and
a certain amount.
Each DM was exposed to all pairs of gambles listed in Table 2.1. DMs were first given the opportunity
to experience each gamble (depending on group assignment) a minimum of 8 times and a maximum of 100
times. Each of the 10 gamble pairs faced by the DM had a unique color code to help in identification across
all the tasks. After experiencing the gambles the DM chose the gamble to play for real payment followed by
ratings of confidence and difficulty. Next, each gamble from the pair was presented individually along with
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a list of certain payments. The starting certain payment was generated randomly, and after each choice the
certain payment was shifted to narrow in on the CE of the gamble.
DMs rated the perceived risk of the gamble after the CE elicitation (see Appendix B). This process is
repeated for both gambles in each of the pairs in Table 2.1. The gamble pairs were presented in a random
order and presented on random sides of the screen.
Phase 2 : The second phase of the experiment elicited the value function independent of the weighting
function using the trade-off method (Wakker & Deneffe, 1996). All groups were subjected to the same
procedure. This was done in description format for all groups for three reasons (1) to reduce error in
elicitation (2) to see if previous experience has an effect on later descriptions, and (3) to reduce the amount
of time and difficulty for the subjects.
Instructions stated that the new choices involve a target risky prospect and an array of 8 risky prospects.
Subjects were shown two gambles - X0 ∼ (x0, p;R, q) and X1 ∼ (x1, p; r, q) with x1 > x0 and R > r, where
p = 0.5, r = 2, x0 = 6, and R = 5 are constant. DMs seek a value of x1 such that (x0, p;R, q) ∼ (x1, p; r, q).
Gamble X0 was displayed on the left, and an array of gambles of the form X1 were displayed on the right
were x1 spans, in equal increments, 5 < x1 < 40. Once x1 was established, the process was repeated such
that x1 replaces x0 and x2 replaces x1. The process was run until estimates for x1, x2, . . . , x5 were obtained
such that v(xi) = i/n.
Payment : Each participant answered a set of exit questions (see Appendix B) before playing the randomly
chosen gambles for real payment. At the end of the experiment 5 gambles and 5 CEs were selected (such that
each of the gambles pairs were randomly selected as either the CE or the gamble chosen), and the choices
played for a final payoff. Using the point conversion and the gambles presented in Table 2.1, participants
could win between $0.00 and $20.00, but all participants were paid a minimum of $5.00 for their time (this
was disclosed only if a participant earned less than $5.00 in the experiment). The mean payment was $6.27
with SD = $1.89.
2.1.3 Experiment 2: Test of goal change in EBDM - H3
Experiment 2 is almost identical to experiment 1. I only describe features that were unique to experiment
2.
Participants
Participants included 50 volunteers (mean age = 20; 70% female) who either responded to an advert for a
paid decision making experiment.
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Procedure
Participants were run on computers in the lab through a web based experimental interface. They read and
signed the informed consent forms before the experiment. Instructions informed each participant about a
series of choices between prospects they were about to make. Their goal was to estimate the probability of
each possible outcome from pairs of gambles. Each estimate was recorded by the computer and payment
was based on the accuracy of the probability estimates (see Appendix C). As in experiment 1, CE choices
also contributed to the final payment and each subject also completed phase 2. Participants were randomly
assigned to 2 conditions: enumerated experience with probability estimation goal, and experienced blank
slate with probability estimation goal.
At the end of the experiment a random selection of 5 estimates and 5 CE choices were used to determine
their final payment (mean payment = $7.67; std. dev. = $1.44). The experiment contained all of the elements
of the previous experiment with the addition of payment based on correctly identifying probabilities.
After the experience phase, instead of choosing between the two gambles, the participant estimated a
probability distribution over all possible outcomes. Outcomes not experienced were not shown. Next, the
participants rated their confidence and the task difficulty (see Appendix A), and chose the gamble they
would like to play for a one-time payment. Instructions emphasized that the objective of the sampling is to
obtain estimates for probability.
2.2 Results
The experimental design manipulates (1) initial information states, (2) experience, and (3) final goals. Table
2.2 presents the different experimental conditions. Many of the results of both experiment 1 (using one-shot
play) and experiment 2 (using probability estimation) are analyzed jointly. I begin with analyzes of the
dependent variables of choices, value functions, weighting functions based on CEs, risk perceptions, and
confidence and difficulty ratings across all 6 groups from the two studies. Next I analyze the measures of
subadditivity that require full description in the two risk groups as well as a test of probability sensitivity
across initial information states. Analyzes of the measures extracted from the experienced samples - sample
length, switching tendency, estimation error, and a tournament of models - involve analysis of all groups
except the risk group. Finally I present an analysis of the probability estimates produced by experiment 2.
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Table 2.2: List of the six experimental conditions from experiments 1 and 2.
Condition Description N
1 Risk: provides a complete description 25
2 Experienced Risk: provides a complete description and experience 26
3 Enumerated Experience: provides a description of the number of
possible outcomes
27
4 Experienced Blank Slate: provides no information, only experi-
ence
25
5 Enumerated Experience Probability: same as condition 3 with
motivation of probability estimation
25
6 Experienced Blank Slate Probability: same as condition 4 with
motivation of probability estimation
25
Choice Proportions
Choice proportions have been the focus of previous studies of EBDM that uncovered choices consistent with
under-weighting of small probabilities. This analysis tests H1 and H2 in evaluating the impact of both
experience and information states on choices. Table 2.3 lists the 10 pairs of gambles used in the experiment.
For each pair, gamble A is the one that has the higher expected value. Gamble pairs 1 - 4 replicate previous
EBDM gamble pairs. Gamble pairs 5 and 6 incorporate for the first time 3 - outcome gambles. Gamble pairs
7 and 8 allow for the computation of upper and lower sub-additivity for the description based conditions (1
and 2). Gamble pairs 9 and 10 test for the sensitivity to changes in probability.
Table 2.3 also provides three sets of predicted proportions of choices of gamble A based on CPT using
the value and weighting functional forms presented by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The predictions use
the same value function parameter α = 0.88 ( Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and three different weighting
function curvatures use parameters intended to represent the impact of each type of weighting function.
The inverse S shaped weighting function has γ = .61, the linear weighting function has γ = 1.00, and the S
shaped weighting function has γ = 1.80.
The proportion of choices of gamble A are presented in Table 2.4. I analyze the choices using 5 preplanned
orthogonal contrasts for each pair of gambles. Contrast 1 tests the hypothesis that choices are affected by the
presence of description (risk vs experience). Contrast 2 tests the hypothesis that choices under experience are
affected by the additional information in enumerated experience against experienced blank slate. Contrast
3 tests the hypothesis that the choices under risk are affected by the presence of experience. Contrast 4
tests the hypothesis that choices under experience are affected by the motivation dictated to the subjects
(estimate probability or one-shot play). Contrast 5 tests the hypothesis that there is an interaction between
motivation and amount of information.
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Table 2.3: Predictions for the gambles based on Tversky and Kahneman functional forms: Inverse S: α = 0.88
and γ = 0.61; Linear: α = 0.88 and γ = 1; S shaped: α = 0.88 and γ = 1.8. Logistic Transformation
= 1/(1 + e(V (B)−V (A))) = predicted percent choice of A.
Problem Gamble A Gamble B Inverse S shaped Weighting Linear weighting S Shaped weighting
Logistic (choice) Logistic (choice) Logistic (choice)
1 (4,.8) (3,1) 0.36 (B) 0.52 (A) 0.55 (A)
2 (4,.2) (3,.25) 0.53 (A) 0.51 (A) 0.49 (B)
3 (32,.1) (3,1) 0.79 (A) 0.37 (B) 0.15 (B)
4 (32,.025) (3,.25) 0.76 (A) 0.47 (B) 0.42 (B)
5 (6,.4; 2,.4) (3,1) 0.40 (B) 0.51 (A) 0.40 (B)
6 (6,.1; 2,.1) (3,.25) 0.57 (A) 0.50 (A) 0.46 (B)
7 (4,.6) (3,.75) 0.53 (A) 0.52 (A) 0.48 (B)
8 (4,.4) (3,.5) 0.54 (A) 0.51 (A) 0.48 (B)
9 (4,.8) (6,.5) 0.51 (A) 0.57 (A) 0.64 (A)
10 (6,.5) (4,.6) 0.61 (A) 0.60 (A) 0.56 (A)
The results of the five contrasts are presented in Table 2.5. Significant differences are established using the
Bonferroni adjustment 0.05 / 5 = 0.01 for a family wise error rate of 0.05. Each significant test is indicated
by a 1 and non-significant tests are indicated by 0. Gamble pairs 2, 7, 8, and 9 provide significant differences
for contrast 1 testing the risk groups against the experience based groups (i.e., the description-experience
gap). Gamble pair 7 provides a significant difference for contrast 4 testing the experience groups with one-
shot play against probability estimation. Contrasts 2, 3, and 5 have no significant differences. In other
words the choice proportions do not show differences for the presence of experience within the risk groups,
the additional information in the experience groups, or an interaction between amount of information and
motivation in the experience groups. The results of the contrasts show only little support for the hypothesized
differences in choice proportions. There are 4 of 10 gamble pairs that reproduce the description-experience
gap.
Gambles pairs 1 - 4 replicate previous studies, so I consider them more carefully. Each choice was
classified as supporting (or not) over-weighting of small probabilities. Table 2.6a shows the number of choices
supporting over-weighting small probabilities (counted as 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4) by the 6 different experimental
groups. The results show support that these two variables are associated. There is more over-weighting of
small probabilities for the risk groups and the fewest occurrences of over-weighting small probabilities in the
experienced blank slate groups. The table is problematic for chi-square test because many of the cells have
counts less than 5 observations. Collapsing the high and low count values using (0+1), 2, (3+4) reduces the
number of low cell counts (see Table 2.6b). The results show a significant association between the number
of choices supporting over-weighting small probabilities and the condition assignment (χ2(10) = 19.41, p <
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Table 2.4: Choice proportions for all 10 gamble pairs and 6 conditions.
Exp Exp
Risk Exp Enum Exp Enum Blank Overall
Problem Gamble A Gamble B Risk Risk Exp Blank Prob Prob Mean
N=25 N=26 N=27 N=25 N=25 N=25
1 (4,.8) (3,1) 0.2 0.46 0.52 0.6 0.36 0.56 0.45
2 (4,.2) (3,.25) 0.48 0.35 0.63 0.8 0.76 0.6 0.6
3 (32,.1) (3,1) 0.32 0.19 0.33 0.16 0.24 0.2 0.24
4 (32,.025) (3,.25) 0.44 0.15 0.22 0.32 0.24 0.28 0.28
5 (6,.4; 2,.4) (3,1) 0.4 0.58 0.59 0.56 0.52 0.36 0.5
6 (6,.1; 2,.1) (3,.25) 0.48 0.42 0.59 0.48 0.6 0.56 0.52
7 (4,.6) (3,.75) 0.24 0.27 0.56 0.8 0.32 0.4 0.43
8 (4,.4) (3,.5) 0.16 0.19 0.59 0.68 0.56 0.36 0.42
9 (4,.8) (6,.5) 0.96 0.81 0.56 0.64 0.64 0.76 0.45
10 (6,.5) (4,.6) 0.84 0.77 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.68 0.6
Overall Mean 0.45 0.42 0.53 0.58 0.5 0.48
Table 2.5: Results of 5 preplanned comparisons for each of the 10 gamble pairs. Significant differences are
based on Bonferoni correction and indicated with a 1.
Gamble Pair Contrast
1 2 3 4 5
1 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0
7 1 0 0 1 0
8 1 0 0 0 0
9 1 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 2.6: Frequency table of group assignment by the number of choices corresponding with over-weighting
small probabilities (gamble pairs 1 - 4).
a) Frequency for counts provides several cells less than 5 observations.
Number of choices
Supporting over-weighting of small probabilities
Condition 0 1 2 3 4 Total
Risk 1 9 5 8 2 25
Experience Risk 5 12 7 2 0 26
Enumerated 5 8 5 9 0 27
Exp. Blank Slate 1 11 8 5 0 25
Enumerated Prob. 1 6 13 5 0 25
Exp. Blank Slate Prob. 2 12 8 2 1 25
Total 15 58 46 31 3 153
Several cells < 5, χ2(20) = 31.53, p < 0.05
b) Frequency for collapsed counts to reduce the number of cells with less than 5 observations.
Number of choices
Supporting over-weighting of small probabilities
Condition 0 + 1 2 3 + 4 Total
Risk 10 5 10 25
Experience Risk 17 7 2 26
Enumerated 13 5 9 27
Exp. Blank Slate 12 8 5 25
Enumerated Prob. 7 13 5 25
Exp. Blank Slate Prob. 14 8 3 25
Total 73 46 34 153
χ2(10) = 19.41, p < 0.05
0.05).
Summary : The results provide moderate support for the description-experience gap in choice. There is no
support for any of the hypotheses about information states or motivation to estimate probabilities. In general
the choice proportions do not follow closely the predictions of prospect theory nor do they perfectly replicate
the results of previous studies. This result can either be attributed to the fact that the gamble experiences
do not directly correspond to the objective gamble definitions or to having each DM face all 10 gamble pairs.
Experiencing and choosing between 10 pairs of gambles may require too much concentration and this may
have fatigued the participants. Conversely, playing 10 gamble pairs may have allowed participants to better
understand the task after the first few gamble pairs. This would imply that participants are making more
informed choices than in studies that require 1 or 2 choices from each participant. Participants might be
more familiar with the purpose of experience and the type of gambles encountered.
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Value Functions
Value functions were elicited using the trade off (TO) method to obtain values that are independent of the
weighting functions. This is the last task encountered by the participants, but the results are analyzed first
because they will be applied to several of the later analyzes. The elicited value functions will be used to
analyze the CEs, the measures of subadditivity, and to provide predictions in the tournament of models.
First I compare the value functions from the various groups to assess the effects of experience (H1).
This was a difficult and confusing task for many subjects and not all results seem reliable. The following
steps were taken to clean the data for use:
• I am interested in value functions in the range of 0 to 32. Several DMs provided values that were
excessively high. If their final value in a sequence (x5) exceeded 100 the sequence was eliminated.
• Several utility elicitations had tied values; these numbers were removed from the sequence. E.g., the
sequence x0 = 6, x1 = 11.25, x2 = 11.25, x3 = 20.45, x4 = 20.45, x5 = 50 was converted to the sequence
x0 = 6, x1 = 11.25, x2 = 20.45, x3 = 50.
• If either x0 or x5 caused the sequence of elicited values to be non-monotonic, that entry (x0 or x5)
was deleted and the remaining (monotonic) points were used.
• Sequences that were shorter than 3 (less than 3 elicited points) were eliminated.
• Non-monotonic value functions that remained after taking all the previous cleaning steps were removed
from the analysis.
The data cleaning step removed 55 of the 153 participants, leaving 98 participants with usable value
functions. For these 98 participants the average number of elicitation points is 4.7 (out of a maximum of 5)
with a total of 22 of the 98 participants’ elicitations altered in the cleaning stage. Each set of values were
normalized by zi = (xi − x0)/(xmax − x0). The normalized values were paired with equal distant points on
the value function such that zi = i/n. The parameter α is fit for each participant assuming a power function
v(zi) = z
α
i .
Since individual parameter estimates would be unstable and unreliable, I use the median of the usable
individual parameter estimates within each group. The median parameter values are reported in Table 2.7.
They are reasonable and consistent with previous results with the TO method. Utility elicitations for the
TO method are reported to be more linear (Wakker & Deneffe, 1996), and to have more cases of risk seeking
than other elicitation methods. The average curvatures of the value functions are not the same across all
groups by Kruskal-Wallis Test (χ2(5) = 15.62, p < 0.05). The enumerated experience group has the lowest
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Table 2.7: Distribution of elicited parameter α for the power value function.
Condition N Min Max Median Mean Std Dev
1. Risk 16 0.47 3.1 1.1 1.27 0.65
2. Experience Risk 17 0.61 3.93 1.1 1.43 0.75
3. Enumerated 17 0.46 1.26 0.96 0.93 0.2
4. Exp. Blank Slate 15 0.61 1.51 1.1 1.12 0.23
5. Enumerated Prob. 16 0.5 1.41 1 0.99 0.22
6. Exp. Blank Slate Prob. 17 0.6 3.1 1.1 1.33 0.63
Overall 98 0.46 3.93 1.1 1.18 0.53
Figure 2.2: Side by side boxplot of the value function parameter estimates,α, for the 6 conditions.
rank score and significantly differs from all groups except enumerated experience probability (which has
the second lowest rank score). The enumerated experience probability significantly differs from only the
expereinced risk group (with the highest rank score).
Summary : The parameter estimates provide results that are reasonable for the amounts of money that
are covered. Results from previous studies using the TO method support the finding of DMs that are more
risk neutral (and even risk seeking) for amounts between $6 and $32.
Certainty Equivalents
Previous results have looked at the shape of probability weighting functions through final choices. These CEs
were assessed separately from the final choices and act as a second, and more direct, method to analyze the
shape of the weighting functions. The elicited CEs are used to test the prediction (H1) that experience based
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Table 2.8: Percent agreement between CE based choices and final choices by condition.
Condition % overlap
Risk 0.56
Experience Risk 0.62
Enumerated 0.70
Exp. Blank Slate 0.66
Enumerated Prob. 0.61
Exp. Blank Slate Prob. 0.60
conditions will produce identity weighting functions, as opposed to inverse-s shaped or s shaped weighting
functions.
The CEs for each gamble are used to infer choices: the gamble with the higher CE is assumed to be the
preferred one. The agreement between the CE based choices and the final choice is reasonably high (60%)
as shown in Table 2.8. These proportions are roughly equal across conditions implying that CEs from the
experience based groups are just as valid as the CEs from the risk based groups.
Table 2.9a presents the proportion of inferred choices of gamble A in each pair for the 6 groups. The choice
proportions are tested using the same 5 contrasts used in the analysis of the final choices. These proportions
show non-significant results across all pairs and contrasts with one exception (very low proportion of choices
for gamble A for pair 3 in the experienced risk condition). These results suggest that CEs are less sensitive to
the various presentation formats and the mechanism causing the differences previously detected in the choices
does not affect the CE elicitations. Table 2.9b shows a frequency table of the number of choices that support
over-weighting of small probability. The results show a significant association between the number of choices
supporting over-weighting small probabilities and the condition assignment (χ2(10) = 20.19, p < 0.05). I
further investigate the results of the CE elicitation by estimating the best fitting weighting function for each
individual DM. The one parameter (γPrelec) Prelec (1998) weighting function is estimated for each individual
DM. The following calculation is used to assess w(p) for CE ∼ (x, p):
w(p) = v(CE)/v(x).
In the two description groups I used the values of x and p as defined for each gamble. In the experience
conditions I used values based on the experienced samples, so that:
w(A) = v(CE)/v(x) where A = (number x’s)/(total sample).
The value functions are assumed to be power functions and five parameter sets are used to test the
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Table 2.9: Choices inferred from CE elicitations for the 10 gamble pairs and 6 experimental conditions.
a) The proportion of choices for gamble A
Exp Exp
Risk Exp Enum Exp Enum Blank Overall
Problem Gamble A Gamble B Risk Risk Exp Blank Prob Prob Mean
N=25 N=26 N=27 N=25 N=25 N=25
1 (4,.8) (3,1) 0.43 0.52 0.56 0.68 0.57 0.68 0.57
2 (4,.2) (3,.25) 0.52 0.65 0.48 0.61 0.5 0.43 0.53
3 (32,.1) (3,1) 0.43 0.08 0.3 0.12 0.24 0.24 0.23
4 (32,.025) (3,.25) 0.57 0.41 0.26 0.4 0.32 0.19 0.36
5 (6,.4; 2,.4) (3,1) 0.52 0.56 0.7 0.56 0.56 0.6 0.58
6 (6,.1; 2,.1) (3,.25) 0.68 0.63 0.52 0.59 0.5 0.24 0.53
7 (4,.6) (3,.75) 0.52 0.68 0.59 0.6 0.46 0.48 0.56
8 (4,.4) (3,.5) 0.57 0.4 0.59 0.71 0.58 0.59 0.57
9 (4,.8) (6,.5) 0.61 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.4 0.49
10 (6,.5) (4,.6) 0.61 0.76 0.78 0.64 0.5 0.58 0.64
Overall Mean 0.55 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.47 0.44
b) Frequency counts of the number of choices supporting over-weighting of small probabilities.
Number of choices
Supporting over-weighting of small probabilities
Condition 0 + 1 2 3 + 4 Total
Risk 9 6 10 25
Experience Risk 18 6 2 26
Enumerated 13 7 7 27
Exp. Blank Slate 14 6 5 25
Enumerated Prob. 9 13 3 25
Exp. Blank Slate Prob. 15 8 2 25
Total 78 46 29 153
χ2(10) = 20.19, p < 0.05
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Table 2.10: Sensitivity analysis of fitted weighting functions to choice of value function.
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 153
Median Group Mean Group Median All Mean All TK
Median Group - 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00
Mean Group 1.00 - 0.99 0.98 0.99
Median All 1.00 0.99 - 0.99 0.99
Mean All 0.98 0.98 0.99 - 0.97
TK 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.97 -
Kendall Tau b Correlation Coefficients, N = 153
Median Group Mean Group Median All Mean All TK
Median Group - 0.93 0.97 0.96 0.94
Mean Group 0.93 - 0.91 0.91 0.90
Median All 0.97 0.91 - 0.97 0.94
Mean All 0.96 0.91 0.97 - 0.92
TK 0.94 0.90 0.94 0.92 -
sensitivity of the estimated weighting function to the choice of α: (1) median estimated α from the TO
method by group, (2) mean estimated α from the TO method by group, (3) median estimated α from
TO method across all participants (4) mean estimates α from TO method across all participants, and (5)
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimate of α = 0.88. Table 2.10 shows the Pearson product moment and
Kendall τ correlation coefficients between the estimates of the parameters of the weighting functions using
various value functions. The correlations are very high. The mean of the Mean Absolute Deviations (MAD)
between each pair of weights is reasonably low, mean MAD = 0.07. The weights are not very sensitive to
changes in value functions so the median by group parameter estimates are used for the current estimation
procedure and are used in the remaining results. The median estimates were chosen because of the unknown
nature of the distribution of γ estimates.
The parameter γ was estimated for each individual. Several participants produced extreme (low or high)
CE estimates. Excessively high CE’s (10 to 20 points above the maximum payment) were typically paired
with high estimates of γ and very high sum squared error in the non-linear fitting routine in SAS. The
final estimates presented in Table 2.11 include only cases where 0.00001 < γ < 5 and SSE < 5; 18 subjects
were eliminated as a results of this process. The four groups from experiment 1 all show roughly equal
parameter estimates of γ ≈ 0.75. The probability estimation groups from experiment 2 produce almost
linear weighting estimates γ ≈ 0.95. However, the differences are not statistically significant by Kruskal-
Wallis test (χ2(5) = 3.94, p = 0.56). Most importantly, the current results do not provide support for
under-weighting small probabilities in EBDM (given by γ > 1).
Summary : While the choice proportions show a description-experience gap, the elicited weighting func-
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Table 2.11: Descriptive statistics of the estimates of γ for the Prelec weighting function. Estimates based
on the median by group α estimates.
Condition alpha N Min Max Median Mean Std Dev
1. Risk 1.10 22 0.11 1.97 0.73 0.72 0.41
2. Experience Risk 1.10 23 0.04 1.72 0.73 0.72 0.41
3. Enumerated 0.96 21 0.21 2.3 0.75 0.87 0.48
4. Exp. Blank Slate 1.10 22 0.16 2.6 0.72 0.82 0.63
5. Enumerated Prob. 1.00 19 0.22 2.09 0.91 0.92 0.45
6. Exp. Blank Slate Prob. 1.10 18 0.07 4.75 0.98 1.06 1.02
Figure 2.3: Side by side boxplot of the weighting function parameter estimates for the 6 conditions. Estimates
based on the median by group α estimates..
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Table 2.12: Categorization of 20 gambles as rare loss or rare win.
Gamble Category
(4,.8) Rare loss
(3,1) Rare loss
(4,.2) Rare win
(3,.25) Rare win
(32,.1) Rare win
(3,1) Rare win
(32,.025) Rare win
(3,.25) Rare win
(6,.4;2,.4) -
(3,1) Rare loss
(6,.1;2,.1) -
(3,.25) Rare win
(4,.6) Rare loss
(3,.75) Rare loss
(4,.4) Rare win
(3,.5) -
(4,.8) Rare loss
(6,.5) -
(6,.5) -
(4,.6) Rare loss
tions remain unchanged. There is evidence that the final goal of probability estimation combined with
experience may influence weighting functions but the results do not show statistically significant differences.
Risk Perception
Risk ratings were collected for all 20 gambles from each participant. The gambles are categorized as either
rare losses or rare wins (see categorization in Table 2.12)1. I expect (H1) that risk perception will decrease
for rare losses and simultaneously increase for rare wins. The analysis is simplified by using the average risk
perception from each DM for the two categories of gambles. Thus, each DM has two dependent variables -
the average risk perception scores for rare losses and for rare wins. These scores are analyzed using repeated
measures ANOVA. The scores for rare loss and rare win show an interactive trend (F (5, 121) = 4.88, p <
0.05), but in the opposite direction from the prediction of H1: risk perception increases in enumerated
experience and experienced blank slate for rare loss, and risk perception decreases for rare win in enumerated
experience and experienced blank slate. The condition factor is not significant.
Summary : Figure 2.4 displays the mean risk ratings (from Table 2.13) for the 6 conditions. The figure
shows more extreme risk ratings (for risky and non-risky gambles) in conditions that present a full description
1Three outcome gambles and the gambles with p = .5 are excluded from the analysis. I do not have any prediction of how
they will be viewed under my hypothesis.
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Table 2.13: Mean risk perception ratings for the 6 conditions for rare loss and rare win.
Condition Rare loss Std. Dev. Rare Gain Std. Dev.
1. Risk 2.84 0.68 5.50 0.72
2. Experience Risk 2.89 1.08 5.35 0.94
3. Enumerated 3.26 0.60 4.69 0.83
4. Exp. Blank Slate 3.38 0.87 4.79 1.04
5. Enumerated Prob. 3.08 1.03 4.55 1.21
6. Exp. Blank Slate Prob. 3.11 0.84 4.52 1.02
Figure 2.4: Mean risk perception ratings for rare loss and rare win for each experimental group.
(groups 1 and 2). The remaining 4 conditions correspond to low initial information states that do not provide
the probability of success or the value of the outcomes. In these conditions the risky gambles are perceived
as less risky, and the safe gambles are perceived as more risky than the two description based conditions.
This result suggests that risk perception is connected more closely to the initial information state, and is not
influenced by the experience sampled. The salience of probability (when subjects are motivated to estimate
it in groups 5 and 6) does not show a noticeable effect on risk perception.
Confidence and Difficulty
Confidence and difficulty were rated for each of the 10 gamble pairs. H2 predicts that different initial
information states would make the task appear more difficult and cause DMs to be less confident. Repeated
measures MANOVA shows significant differences between the gambles for both confidence (F (9, 139) =
13.35, p < .05) and difficulty (F (9, 139) = 4.56, p < .05) indicating that DMs were sensitive to the different
gamble pairs (see Figure 2.5). The results do not support the predictions of H2 that information state is
linked with confidence or difficulty. The highest average confidence is produced by gamble pairs 1, 3, and 9.
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Figure 2.5: Mean difficulty and confidence ratings of the 10 gamble pairs by condition.
a) Mean confidence ratings for the 10 gamble pairs listed in Table 2.1.
b) Mean difficulty ratings for the 10 gamble pairs listed in Table 2.1.
The lowest average confidence is produced by gamble pairs 2 and 6. The most difficult choice is produced
by gamble pair 6, and the least difficult choice is produced by gamble pair 3.
Upper and Lower Subadditivity
The initial information states in groups 1 and 2 are equivalent, and the only difference between them is
the addition of experience before choices and CEs are collected. To test if experience has an impact on the
weighting function (as predicted by H1), I investigate measures of lower and upper sub-additivity (Tversky
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Table 2.14: Gambles to be used for measures of d and d′ as tests of sub-additivity between groups.
A B A ∪B
Lower 1 (4,.2) (4,.4) (4,.6)
Lower 2 (4,.2) (4,.6) (4,.8)
Lower 3 (3,.25) (3,.5) (3,.75)
SA A ∪B B
Upper 1 (3,.5) (3,.75) (3,.25)
Upper 2 (4,.8) (4,.4) (4,.2)
Upper 3 (4,.6) (4,.8) (4,.4)
Table 2.15: Measure of lower subadditivity (d), upper subadditivity (d′), and the sensitivity to changes in
probability (s).
Mean Median
Condition N d d′ s d d′ s
1. Risk 25 0.18 0.27 0.55 0.06 0.19 0.59
2. Exp. Risk 25 0.16 0.23 0.61 0.13 0.19 0.68
& Fox, 1995). These measures can be computed for the risk conditions, which provide full descriptions of
the gambles, using the following formulas:
Lower SA ⇒ D(A,B) = W (A) +W (B)−W (AUB)
Upper SA ⇒ D′(A,B) = 1−W (S −A)−W (AUB) +W (B)
Estimates of D and D′ are based on the CEs for sets of three gambles using the weights, W (.), estimated
from the CE’s and the estimated value functions.
Table 2.14 shows the gamble combinations used to compute measures of lower and upper subadditivity.
The measures are averaged within each DM to compute a global measure per individual denoted d and d′,
and compute s = 1− d− d′ as a measure of sensitivity to changes in probability. Inverse-S shaped weighting
functions correspond to d ≥ 0, d′ ≥ 0, and s ≤ 1. Identity weighting functions correspond to d = 0, d′ = 0,
and s = 1. Therefore I expect to find lower values of d and d′ in condition 2 complemented by higher values
of s as predicted by H1.
Table 2.15 shows the measures of probability sensitivity for the two risk conditions. One subject was
removed because of an excessively high measure of s = 12.98. The results show an increase in sensitivity (s)
in the presence of experience in the predicted direction of H1 (experience induces more linear sensitivity to
probability), but the change is not significant by Wilcoxon two sample test.
Summary : These results reflect the stability of the weighting function estimates revealed by the previous
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Figure 2.6: Proportion of choices for gamble A in pairs 9 and 10 by initial information state..
analysis of the CEs. Both analyzes point toward a stable inverse-s shaped weighting function.
Probability Sensitivity
Gamble pairs 9 and 10 provide a final method of testing sensitivity to probability in EBDM. Both pairs
include the gamble (6, 0.5). In pair 9 it is compared with the gamble (4, 0.8), and in pair 10 with (4, 0.6) (see
Table 2.1). These two pairs are unique in that CPT predicts the preference of gamble A for all the weighting
functions under consideration. In this case, choice by CPT corresponds with expected value maximizing.
Expected value favors the gamble with the higher probability of a lower outcome in gamble pair 9 (i.e., (4,
0.8)), and the gamble with the lower probability of a higher outcome in gamble pair 10 (i.e., (6, 0.5)). I
predicted an interactive effect because the EBDM groups are less sensitive to the change in probability. I
expected to find the risk groups to show consistently strong choice for gamble A in both pairs 9 and 10.
Under the predicted interaction the experience based groups should show strong preference for gamble A in
pair 10, and weaker preference for gamble A in pair 9.
The choice proportions for gamble pairs 9 and 10 are tested using repeated measures 2 way MANOVA
on the groups in experiment 1 categorized as either risk (groups 1 and 2) or experience (groups 3 and 4).
The test reveals a significant difference for initial information state (F (1, 101) = 12.23, p < 0.05) and a
non-significant result for the interaction (F (1, 101) = 1.97, p = 0.16). The proportions of choices for gamble
A show a stronger preference for gamble A in the risk groups and an overall weaker preference for gamble A
in the experience groups. Figure 2.6 shows that the data produce the predicted interaction but the pattern
is not significant.
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Summary : The results show differences between description and experience with respect to gambles
with probabilities near 0.50. Previous research has uncovered differences using gambles with rare events.
The current analysis shows a general difficulty for the experience based groups to estimate the objective
probability of success and identify small changes in the probability of winning.
Experienced Samples
Properties of Experienced Samples: Hypothesis 3 predicts that search patterns of experienced samples will
change when the final goal is changed. The comparisons will focus on the four groups defined by the ma-
nipulation of information state (enumerated vs. experience blank slate) and the manipulation of motivation
(one-shot play vs. probability estimation). The dependent variables of interest are sample size and switching
tendency.
Sample size is tested using three way repeated measures MANOVA with a repeated factor of gamble
pair, and two between subjects factors defined by information state and motivation. There is a significant
motive effect (F (1, 98) = 6.18, p < 0.05) and a significant gamble pair effect (F (9, 90) = 5.14, p < 0.05).
Figure 2.7 shows that the incentives for accurate probability estimation produce larger sample sizes. These
results support H3 that increasing the salience of probability will increase the sample size because the task
is more difficult.
Switching is tested using the same approach. Switching shows a significant effect for the information state
factor (F (1, 98) = 4.37, p < 0.05), a gamble pair effect (F (9, 90) = 2.10, p < 0.05), and a motivation - gamble
pair interaction (F (9, 90) = 2.73, p < 0.05). Figure 2.7 shows that experience blank slate produces more
switches across the 10 gamble pairs than enumerated experience. These results support H2 that different
initial information states trigger different approaches to understanding the gamble pairs.
Summary : Hypothesis 3 predicted interaction effects for both switching and sample size. This effect was
not detected for either variable. Instead I found that the sample length is associated with motivation and
the switching tendency is associated with information states.
Estimation Accuracy : Three measures of estimation accuracy introduced in Section 1.6.1 - vbayes, vCV ,
and vV AR - were computed for each sample. These measures allow for a more refined look at the types of
samples generated in each condition to provide additional tests for H3 that goal change impacts the search
process. They depend not only on the length of each sample but also the magnitude of the probabilities the
DMs estimate. The analysis is constrained to the search patterns for binary gambles (excluding the trinary
gambles leaving a total of 15 gambles).
Estimation accuracy is tested using three way repeated measures MANOVA with a repeated factor of
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Figure 2.7: A plot of the significant effects for sample length and switching for the 10 gamble pairs listed in
Table 2.1.
a) Sample size by motivating incentive.
b) Switching tendency by initial information state.
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Figure 2.8: Mean Bayesian estimation accuracy measure (vbayes) for the 15 binary gambles by motivating
incentives.
gamble pair, and two between subjects factors defined by information state and motivating incentives. The
results are identical for all three measures so I only report the results for the Bayesian method. There
is a significant motivating incentive effect (F (1, 98) = 5.74, p < 0.05) and a significant gamble pair effect
(F (14, 85) = 23.34, p < 0.05). Figure 2.8 shows that incentives for accurate probability estimation produce
samples that achieve more accurate estimation (i.e., the measure vbayes is lower for probability estimation
groups). These results support H3 that increasing the salience of probability affects the experience samples.
The gamble (32, 0.025) produced the lowest posterior variance on average, and the gambles (4, 0.60), (6,
0.50), (3, 0.50), and (6, 0.50) produced the highest posterior variance on average.
Summary : Bayesian error estimation provides the clearest differences between the experimental condi-
tions. Estimation error is significantly reduced for probability estimation groups showing that the one-shot
play groups are less focused on probability estimation.
Tournament of Models
The prediction of each model is based on the experienced samples (for 5 of the groups used). The tourna-
ment allows for the direct evaluation of different CPT weighting functions as well as other heuristic based
decision models. H2 predicts very different performances from models based on initial information state.
I hypothesized better performance for probability based models (CPT and SEU) in experienced risk and
enumerated experience and, conversely, predicted that simplifying heuristics (maxi-max, natural mean, and
contrast model) will perform better in experienced blank slate group.
Two tournaments are used to evaluate the predictive ability of several decision models that have per-
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formed well in previous studies. The model performance was evaluated by the overall rate of correct pre-
dictions complemented by a pair-wise analysis using only cases where the two models being compared
have distinct predictions. Tournament 1 tests the predictive ability of maximax, natural mean, cumulative
prospect theory two stage model, maximum probability, contrast, and contrast indicator. Tournament 2
compares the predictive ability of several parameter sets from the CPT two stage model with the average
based models (natural mean and contrast models). The tournaments are run across all choices from each
DM in groups 2-6.
Tournament 1 is a replication of the previous model analyses performed on the Hertwig et al. (2004) data
set. Table 2.16a shows the number of predictions from each model and the overall rate of correct predictions.
The overall difference in performance between the decision models is small (excluding the low performance
of maximax). I found high performance for the CPT two stage model, the natural mean heuristic, and
the contrast models. Choices in experienced risk are the least predictable and those in experienced blank
slate are the most predictable. This is not surprising because DMs in experienced risk rely on the full
description and may not base their choices on the experienced samples. Table 2.16b shows the results of a
pair-wise comparison of the models - It compares the number of choices favoring each model to the number
of choices favoring the competing models for cases with distinct predictions only (see Table 2.16c for the
mean number of unique predictions for each model). I predicted that CPT two stage model to be the top
performing model for conditions that facilitate the use of probabilities (i.e., experienced risk, enumerated
experience, and the probability estimation conditions). I also predicted that the average based heuristic
models would perform best in the lower information states (experienced blank slate). The CPT two stage
model is the top performing model for conditions involving described experience, enumerated experience,
and enumerated experience with probability estimation. The natural mean is the top performing for the
experienced blank slate condition (as found in previous experiments), and the contrast model is the top
performing for experienced blank slate with probability estimation.
Table 2.17a shows the results for tournament 2 which takes advantage of the unique opportunity to use
CPT parameters estimated for each of the conditions. The CPT two stage model is used for the parameters
supplied by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) α = .88, γ = .61 (CPT-TK). I also test the CPT model using the
median parameters fit for each DM from the value and weighting functions (CPT-Fit). I additionally test
predictions from the CPT two stage model using α coefficients from the group level fits and an arbitrarily
chosen coefficient for γ = 1.8 to represent under-weighting of small probabilities associated with an s-shaped
weighting function (CPT-S). Incorporating the CPT-S model in the pair-wise tournament allows me to test if
the natural mean heuristic provides predictions that correspond with predictions from CPT with an s-shaped
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Table 2.16: Tournament 1: Comparison of decision models showing high performance in previous studies.
a) Overall percent correct model prediction based on experience samples. Top model performances are
highlighted.
Exp. Enum Exp. Enumerated Exp. Exp. Blank Slate
Risk Exp. Blank Slate Prob Estimation Prob Estimation
Model N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean Overall
Maximax 253 0.53 268 0.66 244 0.7 242 0.55 247 0.53 0.59
Nat Mean 242 0.62 255 0.75 239 0.77 229 0.66 241 0.68 0.70
CPT-KT 253 0.6 268 0.77 244 0.75 242 0.67 247 0.66 0.69
MaxProb 211 0.59 254 0.7 235 0.76 233 0.63 240 0.65 0.66
Contrast Ind. 245 0.59 244 0.73 228 0.76 235 0.66 236 0.68 0.68
Contrast 242 0.6 258 0.73 238 0.74 233 0.66 244 0.68 0.68
Overall 0.59 0.72 0.75 0.64 0.65
b) Geometric mean of the pair-wise model competition.
Exp. Enum Exp. Enumerated Exp. Exp. Blank Slate
Risk Exp. Blank Slate Prob Estimation Prob Estimation
Model Wins Mean Wins Mean Wins Mean Wins Mean Wins Mean
Maximax 1 0.79 0 0.77 0 0.8 0 0.56 0 0.42
Nat Mean 4 1.82 4 1.35 5 1.66 2 1.14 4 1.60
CPT-KT 5 1.83 5 2.3 4 1.21 5 1.53 3 1.31
MaxProb 0 0.51 2 0.77 3 1.02 1 0.87 1 0.95
Contrast Ind. 3 1.16 1 0.67 1 0.81 4 1.19 2 1.30
Contrast 2 1.20 3 1.19 2 0.88 4 1.25 5 1.87
c) Average number of unique predictions.
Enumerate Exp. Enumerated Exp. Exp. Blank Slate
Model Exp. Risk Exp. Blank Slate Prob Estimation Prob Estimation
Maximax 72.6 94.8 70.4 81 80.8
Nat Mean 38.6 45 39 39.2 38.2
CPT-KT 51 66.6 61 71 58.8
MaxProb 44 72.6 61 63.8 59.4
Contrast Ind. 59.4 44 40.4 52.8 40.2
Contrast 45.2 48.4 41.8 42.6 42.4
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weighting function. If the predictions from natural mean and CPT-S correspond the pair-wise tournament
will show a lower number of unique predictions from the natural mean when compared with CPT-S and a
very high percent concurring correct predictions.
The results in Table 2.17b repeats the pattern of high performance from CPT two stage model for
experienced risk, enumerated experience, and enumerated experience probability and the natural mean and
contrast model for the experienced blank slate conditions. The CPT two stage model with an S-shaped
weighting function shows the best performance for experienced risk and enumerated experience probability.
In fact, the CPT-S model is the best performing model across all conditions (i.e., a geometric mean > 1 for
all conditions). While the s-shaped weighting functions are not supported by the CE elicitation, the CPT-S
model is capturing some type of systematic behavior in all conditions.
Summary : The tournament supports the predictions of H2 about the impact of information states on
decision model performance. The tournaments reveal that for several groups there is a superior fit for CPT
models with inverse-s shaped weighting functions. Comparisons of CPT-S and the natural mean heuristic
(see full results in Appendix D) do not show high overlap with the natural mean heuristic. The results to
do show an extremely high level of identical predictions between CPT-S and CPT-Fit across all conditions
(unique predictions range from 24 - 53 with roughly 60% identical correct predictions)! The new contrast
model performs very well in both tournaments, and is the best model for experienced blank slate probability.
This model deviates from the natural mean heuristic by differentially weighting the averages of the sampled
experience.
Probability Estimates
Probability estimates were collected after participants experienced each pair of gambles and before the
participants choose which of the two gambles they would rather play. The predictions of H2 emphasize the
role of outcome enumeration on probability estimation (as opposed to weighting). I predicted two potential
mechanisms: Enumerated environments will show regressive estimates in comparison to experience blank
slate due to ignorance priors, and estimates will show overall underestimation in experience blank slate in
comparison to enumerate environments by allowing for the possibility of an unknown outcome to occur.
Summary : The probability estimation task appears to be difficult for participants. The data required
a lot of cleaning steps that include normalizing probabilities to sum to one, removing repeated estimates,
and identifying missing estimates. The estimates showed 14% of the cases were missing and 18% of the
remaining cases required normalization. As an additional complication in some cases some of the subjects
sampled only one outcome. The probability estimates are collapsed across all participants and are plotted
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Table 2.17: Tournament 2: Comparison of 3 forms of Cumulative Prospect Theory and three average based
models.
a) Overall percent correct model prediction based on experience samples. Top model performances are
highlighted.
Exp. Enum Exp. Enumerated Exp. Exp. Blank Slate
Risk Exp. Blank Slate Prob Estimation Prob Estimation
Model N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean Overall
Nat Mean 242 0.62 255 0.75 239 0.77 229 0.66 241 0.68 0.7
Contrast Ind. 245 0.59 244 0.73 228 0.76 235 0.66 236 0.68 0.68
Contrast 242 0.6 258 0.73 238 0.74 233 0.66 244 0.68 0.68
CPT-KT 253 0.6 268 0.77 244 0.75 242 0.67 247 0.66 0.69
CPT-FIT 253 0.61 268 0.77 244 0.76 242 0.66 248 0.67 0.69
CPT-S 253 0.64 268 0.74 244 0.78 242 0.7 248 0.7 0.71
Overall 0.61 0.75 0.76 0.67 0.68
b) Geometric mean of the pair-wise model competition.
Exp. Enum Exp. Enumerated Exp. Exp. Blank Slate
Risk Exp. Blank Slate Prob Estimation Prob Estimation
Model Wins Mean Wins Mean Wins Mean Wins Mean Wins Mean
Nat Mean 2 0.97 2 0.9 4 1.2 0 0.85 3 1
Contrast Ind. 1 0.87 0 0.62 0 0.82 3 0.96 1 0.93
Contrast 0 0.84 1 0.86 1 0.88 3 0.93 4 1.12
CPT-KT 4 1.1 3 1.35 3 1.07 4 1.12 2 1
CPT-FIT 3 1.01 5 1.22 2 0.99 2 0.96 0 0.92
CPT-S 5 1.19 4 1.14 5 1.1 5 1.16 5 1.07
c) Average number of unique predictions.
Enumerate Exp. Enumerated Exp. Exp. Blank Slate
Model Exp. Risk Exp. Blank Slate Prob Estimation Prob Estimation
Nat Mean 73 65 63 62 61
Contrast Ind. 81 63 62 72 58
Contrast 75 68 64 65 62
CPT-KT 82 86 79 83 71
CPT-FIT 124 125 111 113 110
CPT-S 123 117 108 108 101
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in Figure 2.9 as a function of the objective probabilities and the relative frequencies. The results show fairly
good performance of reproducing the probabilities defining each gamble. Each of the gamble pairs is tested
individually using repeated measures ANOVA with the within subjects factor of gambles A and B of each
pair and the between subjects factor of information state. There were no significant differences between the
two conditions.
2.3 Discussion
The experiment involved three key manipulations (1) experience, (2) initial information state, and (3) mo-
tivation for experience (probability estimation or one-shot play). The dependent variables included choices,
value functions, CEs, risk perception, confidence, and difficulty ratings. Measures of upper and lower sub-
additivity provided a look at how experience can impact the sensitivity to probability in decisions under
risk. I analyzed the sample size, switching tendency, and estimation error in the experience conditions where
participants sampled information. I also compared several decision models using the history of the sampled
items to predict the final choices.
The experiment tested three sets of predictions. H1 predicted changes in weighting functions and risk
perception that correspond with the use of samples. Participants in the experienced based conditions were
predicted to have weighting functions that deviated from the inverse-s shape of DBDM in the direction of
identity weighting. H2 predicted changes in choices and experienced samples corresponding to differences in
the initial information states. I predicted that more initial information would produce choices that resemble
more closely choices under risk. The experienced samples were predicted to show differences in length,
switching, and estimation accuracy that reflect different decision strategies. H3 predicted similar changes in
choices and experienced samples corresponding to different motivating incentives.
In this section I summarize first the impacts of the three manipulated variables on the various dependent
variables. Then, I discuss the implications of the current results for the description-experience gap and finish
with final conclusions and future directions.
What is the effect of experience?
I incorporated experience for different initial information states ranging from risk to blank slate. When
comparing the two risk groups, there were no systematic differences in the choice proportions (both final
choice and choices inferred from the CE) and no systematic differences in the weighting or the value functions.
As predicted, I found that, compared to the other experience groups, the experienced risk group sampled
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Figure 2.9: Plots of objective probability and relative frequency versus estimated probability.
a) Side by side boxplot of probability estimates by objective probability.
b) Scatter plot of probability estimates by relative frequency.
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much less because the experience was not required to make an “informed” choice. For this reason it is not
surprising that decisions under risk have a less pronounced description-experience gap.
I used lower and upper subadditivity to get a measure of sensitivity to a probability that is simpler
and more stable than estimating weighting functions. Compared to risk, the participants in experience
risk displayed a reduced subadditivity with an increase in probability sensitivity. These results show fairly
conclusively that probability sensitivity was not altered by providing experience for decisions under risk.
These results could have been produced by different mechanisms. It is possible that in this context DMs
did not pay much attention to the experience. It is also possible that the samples experienced were fully
consistent with the parameters described, or that experience does not strongly influence decision making
under risk. Future investigations should seek to uncover which mechanism is causing the results. A potential
way to get participants to pay more attention to the experience and simultaneously provide a description
would be to give a DM a set of multiple descriptions and several decks of cards. Each deck would be
associated with one of the descriptions, but the DM would not know which description belongs to which
deck. Participants would be required to sample from each of the decks and match the description with the
correct deck. Once this task is finished, then the DM could make a choice between pairs of decks (each with
a full description). This would force participants to pay closer attention to the samples and would increase
the impact of the experienced samples on the final choices.
Several instances of the description-experience gap were detected when comparing choices in the risk
groups to the remaining experience groups. The description-experience gap was only detected when com-
paring the groups with full descriptions (regardless of experience) to the groups without a full description.
H1 predicted that experience should cause a shift in the weighting function to produce choices reflecting
the description-experience gap. In most cases the CE based choice proportions and the elicited probability
weighting functions were stable across the groups motivated by one-shot play regardless of experience. The
participants in the groups motivated by probability estimation did show shifts in weighting function param-
eters. The results suggest that experience motivated by probability estimation affects probability sensitivity
while experience motivated by one-shot play does not. I will discuss these results further in the section on
motivating incentives.
The choices of the participants in the experienced blank slate group were highly predictable by the CPT s-
shaped weighting functions in the tournament of models. Independent elicitation of weighting functions from
CEs provided inverse-s shaped weighting functions from the same DMs. These results directly contradict
previous research that suggested experience causes under-weighting of small probabilities (i.e., an s shaped
weighting function). If the final choices were produced by an s shaped weighting function, this would have
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been revealed from the CEs.
I predicted (H1) that risk perception is the mechanism through which experience influences choices. Risk
perception ratings were less extreme for all experience groups (except for experienced risk). The participants
in the experience groups perceived rare win gambles as less risky and rare loss gambles as more risky than
the participants in the risk groups. Changes in risk perception did not correlate with probability weighting
functions. Risk perception appears to be more closely tied to the absence or presence of a full description,
as discussed below.
In conclusion experience appears to have little influence on choices with similar initial information states.
The effects of experience cannot be traced to probability sensitivity or weighting functions. The description-
experience gap most likely occurs because experience is typically paired with low initial information states.
What is the effect of initial information states?
Experience based decision making is often paired with low initial information states. The experience is
necessary because the DMs do not have sufficient information about the prospects they are facing. I discuss
the effects of initial information states on risk perception, choices, and the tournament of models. The
discussion focuses on the impact of large changes in information states (i.e., risk vs. experience) and smaller
changes in initial information states (i.e., enumerated experience vs. experience blank slate).
The analysis of risk perception uncovered an unexpected interaction between the presence/absence of
a full description and the nature of the gamble (rare loss vs. rare win). The absence of a full description
reduced the sensitivity to risk: rare win gambles were perceived as less risky and rare loss gambles were
perceived as more risky without descriptions compared to risk perceptions from DMs with full descriptions.
This finding supports, partially, H2 suggesting that DMs have less ability to perceive the differential risks
they face with low initial information. These results may be due in part because I do not have gambles in
the domain of losses, and “risk” may be typically associated with “loss”.
The choices showed several instances of the description-experience gap. Significant differences were ob-
served between the two risk groups and the two experience groups. There was no support for the predictions
of H2 for differences between enumerated experience and experienced blank slate, even for the new 3 out-
comes gambles. Gamble pairs 9 and 10 were devised to see if DMs would detect a change in probability and
would be sensitive to this change without a full description by aligning the predictions of CPT (regardless
of the weighting function shape) with maximization of expected value (EV ). I predicted the DMs in the
description groups would display more choices for gamble A in both pairs 9 and 10, but the DMs in the
experience groups would choose gamble A more frequently in pair 10 (when the larger EV also provides the
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higher positive outcomes - EV (6, 0.50) > EV (4, 0.60) and 6 > 4) and less frequently in pair 9 (when the
larger EV also provides the lower positive outcome - EV (4, 0.80) > EV (6, 0.50) and 4 < 6). The partici-
pants in the experienced based conditions selected the higher EV gambles less frequently in both pairs. The
results failed to show a significant interaction implying that choices are generally less predictable for the
experience groups that do not have a full description. The results suggest that the mere presence or absence
of a full description is important to allow DMs to accurately use probabilities in making decisions.
The tournament of models provides additional insight into the impact of initial information states. H2
predicted that DMs in the experienced risk and enumerated experience conditions would use probabilities
as outlined by CPT. The tournament shows better predictions by CPT-TK/Fit models for these groups. H2
predicted that the experienced blank slate (a replication of EBDM) would induce DMs to use simplifying
heuristics based on simple averages of their sampled experience. Indeed, the natural mean heuristic and the
contrast model outperformed the CPT-TK/Fit models for these groups.
The tournament of models also revealed high predictive ability for the CPT-S model that uses the fitted α
coefficients along with γ = 1.8 (i.e., a weighting function that under-weights small probabilities). This is the
best performing model for the experienced risk and enumerated experience with motivation for probability
estimation and shows generally high performance across all conditions. The high performance of CPT-S is
not surprising for the groups that were instructed to estimate probabilities because these conditions produced
weighting functions closest to the s-shape. The high performance of CPT-S in experienced blank slate is
more surprising because the estimates of weighting functions in this condition were consistent with inverse-s
shaped weighting functions (average γ = 0.72).
The results of the tournament combined with the results of the switching tendency shows moderate
evidence of less focus on estimating probabilities EBDM blank slate and highest focus on estimating prob-
abilities for enumerated blank slate (supporting some of the predictions of H2). Overall, enumeration of
the outcomes did not change the experience sampling behavior. I found that CPT with an inverse-s shaped
weighting function was the best performing decision model in the enumerated experience group. This is the
first evidence for inverse-s shaped weighting functions in the EBDM.
Removing the full description appears to have the largest impact and may be responsible for many of
the observed behaviors. The amount of information can impact the approach a DM takes to understand the
gambles, as well as the how risks are perceived. Experience in the face of a full description does not change
risk perception. The changes in risk perception occur when descriptions are not provided.
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What is the effect of the motivating incentives for experience?
Changes in the final goal (payment scheme) were predicted to change the relative salience of probabilities
in EBDM. H3 predicted that goal change would affect the experience samples to provide better probability
estimation and allow decision makers to make better choices. The analysis of choices provided little evidence
(a single significant difference) that incentive impacts choices. As predicted by H3, I found different sampling
patterns (differences in sample length and estimation error) between the experience groups. Samples were
longer for conditions that incentivized probability estimation and the accuracy threshold was lower (i.e., less
variance) in the conditions that incentivized probability estimation.
The changes in the weighting functions that I predicted in H1 (for all experience based groups) were con-
firmed in the groups that were instructed to estimate probabilities suggesting that changes in the weighting
functions may occur only when experience is focused on probability estimation. While these changes are not
statistically significant, the parameters changed markedly in the predicted direction (towards γ ≈ 1).
While changing the motivation of experience did not induce large differences in choices, there were
detectable differences in the experienced samples. Sample size has been previous linked to payment amount
(Hau et al. 2008). My experiment shows it may also depend on the motivating incentives for experience
(incentive magnitudes were equal for both experiments). Increased sample size also had the desired effect
of reducing the estimation error for probability estimation. While estimation error was reduced, the final
choices reflected few detectable differences. In conclusion, changing the motivation affected the sampling
process but did not affect choices. Finally, the motivation to estimate probability was linked to shifts in the
weighting functions.
What is causing the description-experience gap?
I replicated the description-experience gap for several of the gamble pairs. Some of the differences were not
significantly different, but were consistent with under-weighting of small probabilities. This suggests that
changes in the choice behavior are not associated with differential sensitivity to probabilities or weighting
functions. The source is most likely due to a misperception of the gambles due to low initial information
states. Another possible explanation is that choices are made using more rudimentary heuristics triggered
by the low initial information state. These two explanations are difficult to tease apart, but a better
understanding of the formations of risk perception in EBDM will help in identifying which explanation is
more valid.
The tournament of models showed differential model performance associated with various initial informa-
tion states and the DMs’ motivating incentives. These differences confirm the predictions of H2. In general,
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the tournament documented a high performance of the CPT-S decision model as in previous studies. The
CPT-S model shows a very high agreement with the CPT-Fit model despite that the gamble pairs were
designed to differentiate between these two decision models. This was most likely caused by experienced
samples that make the choices clearer (easier) and no longer provide divergent predictions (i.e., a result
of the amplification effect from Hertwig & Pleskac, 2008). Designing gamble pairs specifically so that the
experienced samples will differentiate between the two weighting functions should provide results that are
more consistent with DBDM.
Contrary to existing literature my experiment suggests that experience might not play a large role.
The synthesis of the results shows the largest effects are due to differences in initial information states,
most specifically the presence or absence of a complete description. There is little evidence to suggest that
experience has a detectable influence in the presence of full information.
What is learned in decision making from experience?
The analysis of the properties of experienced samples provides several new contributions to the study of
EBDM. The most important result is that the methods used by DMs to search and learn are influenced by
the final goal and their initial information state. Participants in the enumerated experience group displayed
fewer switches between the gambles than participants in experienced blank slate. Participants in the groups
that incentivized probability estimation displayed increased sample size for better probability estimation
when compared to participants incentivized by a one-shot play. A secondary interesting result is that the
need to make a choice between two unknown prospects induced shorter searches than the need to estimate
the parameters of the same two prospects.
Limitations and caveats
In retrospect, there are several potential problems with the experiment. Each DM faced 10 gamble pairs (20
gambles total) and made several additional choices for the CE elicitations. EBDM decision tasks require more
time and attention than the DBDM tasks. The additional time requirements could have caused participants
to stop paying attention or answer randomly to finish the task quicker. The experiment could have benefited
from presenting fewer gamble pairs to each DM.
A second problem is associated with the use of the trade off (TO) method to elicit value functions.
This method was used because elicitations are independent of the probability weighting function. The TO
method proved to be too complicated for many participants in an already difficult context of experienced
based decisions. The weighting function elicitations were robust to different types of value functions so this
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elicitation may not be required for future experiments because simpler and easier elicitation methods are
desirable.
Finally, the experienced risk condition may not have motivated DMs to sample and pay attention to the
experiences. In the future, this condition might benefit from being run in a way that requires the DM to
experience the gambles, such as linking “unknown prospects” to descriptions by using experiences (the DM
is required to experience the gambles in order to identify the correct description). This puts experienced risk
at the same initial information state as experienced blank slate with the difference being that experience
can lead to a full description.
Final conclusions and future directions
Several of the hypotheses were supported by the results of the experiment. Changes in initial information
states (H2) produced differences in choice proportions as well as risk perceptions. Enumerated experience
produced differences with respect to learning in the sampled experience and the choice process (as manifested
in the tournament of models). The motivating incentives (H3) also produced the predicted differences with
respect to learning in the sampled experience. The most interesting result is that DMs will seek out less
information to make a choice between two unknown prospects than to estimate the probabilities of the
outcomes. The effects of changing the motivation for experience (or even the motivation for seeking out
advice and information) provides the possibility of new and exciting directions of research that may find
applications in several areas of decision making, economics, and policy making.
Several of the hypotheses were not supported by the evidence collected from the experiment. There is no
evidence to support a link between risk perception and weighting functions as predicted by H1. Despite this
missing link, results showed stability in weighting functions that contradicts previous results in the EBDM
literature. I expected to find weighting functions shifting closer to identity, but I did not expect that the
weighting functions under experience would be indistinguishable from the weighting functions under risk.
Assuming that the elicitation method did not cause biases in the estimated weighting, the results clearly
show that the description-experience gap is not caused by changes in probability weighting.
The manipulation of initial information states revealed an unexpected pattern of differences in risk
perception. The most interesting result is the reduction in sensitivity to risk in conditions with low initial
information. Although the results did not support my predictions about the source of the differences between
EBDM and DBDM, they highlight the importance of perceived risk in this context and provide a new
direction for future research in EBDM. The failure to find the correlation between risk perception and
weighting functions (H1) suggests that the mechanisms causing the description-experience gap are not linked
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with weighting functions, but may be linked with the DM’s perception of the gambles. Future studies could
include more refined assessments of risk perception such as asking DMs to compare directly the riskiness of
the various experienced gambles. These ratings could be used to look more closely at how gamble parameters
(e.g., magnitude of outcomes or probability of success) shape perceptions of risk in EBDM.
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Appendix A
Instructions
A.1 Experiment 1
Welcome to the experiment. If you have any questions please ask the experimenter. This experiment has
two phases. I will discuss the first phase now. Instructions for the second phase will be provided later.
The first phase of the experiment consists of 10 rounds. You will make a series of choices regarding a
set of prospects. You can think of each prospect as a deck of cards where each card has a number of points
written on it. A play from a prospect is just a random draw of a card from a shuﬄed deck, and winning or
losing the number of points written on the selected card.
Prospects will be presented in pairs, each named with a unique color. Your goal is to pick the prospect
that you prefer to play in each pair. When you choose a prospect, you will be given the opportunity to play
the prospect once.
You will make 10 choices between prospect pairs identifying which prospect you prefer to play for real
points. Each choice will be recorded and saved by the computer. At the end of the experiment we will play
several of your choices for real money. These choices will be randomly selected, so you should treat every
choice you make as if it will be for real money. The points earned in these choices will be converted to cash,
Each point = $0.30.
While you are evaluating the prospects, we ask that you remember both prospects (regardless of which
you chose), because they will be carried over to a second task.
Experience Conditions Only
You are given the opportunity to experience each of the prospects before you make your final choice. To
experience a prospect, select the radio button to indicate the prospect you wish to experience and then press
’Experience Selected Prospect’. A random outcome will be presented in the window marked ’Experience’.
This experience does not determine your final payment. When you determined that you have acquired
sufficient experience, click ’Make Choice’ to make a choice for real money.
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A.2 Experiment 2
Welcome to the experiment. If you have any questions please ask the experimenter. This experiment has
two phases. We will discuss the first phase now. Instructions for the second phase will be provided later.
The first phase of the experiment consists of 10 rounds. You will be provided with several sets of
prospects. You can think of each prospect as a deck of cards where each card has a number of points written
on it. Aplay from a prospect is just a random draw of a card from a shuﬄed deck, and winning or losing
the number of points written on the selected card.
Prospects will be presented in pairs, each named with a unique color. Your goal is to find all possible
outcomes, and to estimate the probability of each outcome. Your payment will depend on the accuracy of
your estimates, and your ability to find ALL outcomes. The probabilities should sum to 1 for each prospect.
Probability estimates that do not sum to 1 will be transformed so that they sum to 1. All of your estimates
will be recorded by the computer and your payment will be computed at the end of the experiment. The
payment will be determined by a randomly selected set of estimates, so you should treat every estimate you
make as if it will be for real money. The points earned in these choices will be converted to cash, Each point
= $0.30.
While you are evaluating the prospects, we ask that you remember both prospects because they will be
carried over to a second task.
You are given the opportunity to experience each of the prospects to produce your estimates. To expe-
rience a prospect, select the radio button to indicate the prospect you wish to experience and then press
’Experience Selected Prospect’. A random outcome will be presented in the window marked ’Experience’.
This experience does not determine your final payment. When you determined that you have acquired
sufficient experience, click ’Submit Probability Estimates’ to input both the outcomes and the probability
estimates.
84
Appendix B
Rating Scales
Confidence (similar for Difficulty)
How confident are you in your choice, please provide a rating from 1 to 5 using the following scale:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all confident Moderately confident Extremely confident
Risk Perception (administered for each gamble separately)
People often see some risk in situations that contain uncertainty about what the outcome or consequences
will be and for which there is the possibility of ’bad’ consequences. Riskiness is a very personal and intuitive
notion, and we are interested in your gut level assessment of how risky each prospect is. Please rate how
risky you think each prospect is by using the following scale:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all risky Moderately Risky Extremely risky
Exit Questions
Please rate for
1) your understanding of each of the choices.
2) the difficulty involved in making choices.
3) the amount of boredom invoked by the task.
4) your feeling of control in obtaining positive outcomes.
5) the amount of confusion invoked by the task.
6) the use of probabilities (or relative frequencies) in summarizing each choice.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
None Moderately Complete
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Appendix C
Probability accuracy payments
scheme
The participant will provide an outcome, and give an estimate of the probability, denoted pest. For each
gamble an outcome will be drawn. We compute the payment using the spherical scoring rule: s = a +
b[p/(p2 + (1− p)2)(1/2)]. If the outcome related to pest is drawn then p = pest, and the opposite outcome
then p = 1− pest. The coefficients a and b will be fixed.
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Appendix D
Full pair-wise results of decision
model prediction tournaments.
Each condition has 6 tables. The tables provide the following information in the following order:
1. Overall percent correct predictions with some descriptive statistics
2. The number of correct predictions for the row model divided by the number of correct predictions for
the column model. These results are based on unique predictions only.
3. The total number of unique predictions for each pair of models.
4. The percent of identical correct predictions from both models.
5. The percent of model predictions where one model was correct and the other model was wrong. Below
the diagonal the row model is wrong and the column model is correct; above the diagonal the row
model is correct and the column model is wrong.
6. Percent of overlapping predictions for each pair of models.
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D.1 Tournament 1
Experienced Risk
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Maximax 253 0.53 0.5 0 1
NatMean 242 0.62 0.49 0 1
CPTKT 253 0.6 0.49 0 1
MaxProb 211 0.59 0.49 0 1
Contrast Ind 245 0.59 0.49 0 1
Cntrst Mean 242 0.6 0.49 0 1
Maximax Nat Mean CPTKT MaxProb Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean
row/col M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 Geo-Mean
Maximax M1 - 0.56 0.51 1.35 0.79 0.74 0.79
Nat Mean M2 1.8 - 0.78 2.5 1.32 1.88 1.82
CPTKT M3 1.95 1.29 - 2.38 1.36 1.75 1.83
MaxProb M4 0.74 0.4 0.42 - 0.54 0.46 0.51
Cntrst Ind M5 1.27 0.76 0.73 1.84 - 1.04 1.16
Cntrst Mean M6 1.35 0.53 0.57 2.18 0.96 - 1.2
Unique M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Maximax M1 - 61 56 91 87 68 72.6
Nat Mean M2 50 - 11 70 40 22 38.6
CPTKT M3 56 22 - 84 53 40 51
MaxProb M4 49 39 42 - 48 42 44
Cntrst Ind M5 79 43 45 82 - 48 59.4
Cntrst Mean M6 57 22 29 73 45 - 45.2
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NCC/N Maximax Nat Mean CPTKT MaxProb Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Maximax M1 - 0.44 0.45 0.36 0.38 0.42
Nat Mean M2 - 0.55 0.41 0.48 0.52
CPTKT M3 - 0.4 0.47 0.51
MaxProb M4 - 0.38 0.41
Cntrst Ind M5 - 0.46
Cntrst Mean M6 -
- NCW/N
NWC/N -
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Maximax M1 - 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.08
Nat Mean M2 0.14 - 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.05
CPTKT M3 0.14 0.02 - 0.08 0.08 0.07
MaxProb M4 0.12 0.05 0.08 - 0.07 0.06
Cntrst Ind M5 0.17 0.04 0.07 0.07 - 0.07
Cntrst Mean M6 0.13 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.06 -
% overlap M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 GM
Maximax M1 - 0.77 0.78 0.65 0.64 0.74 0.71
Nat Mean M2 0.77 - 0.92 0.69 0.79 0.9 0.81
CPTKT M3 0.78 0.92 - 0.68 0.77 0.85 0.8
MaxProb M4 0.65 0.69 0.68 - 0.63 0.68 0.67
Cntrst Ind M5 0.64 0.79 0.77 0.63 - 0.78 0.72
Cntrst Mean M6 0.74 0.9 0.85 0.68 0.78 - 0.78
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Enumerated Experience
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Maximax 268 0.66 0.47 0 1
NatMean 255 0.75 0.43 0 1
CPTKT 268 0.77 0.42 0 1
MaxProb 254 0.7 0.46 0 1
Cntrst Ind 244 0.73 0.45 0 1
Cntrst Mean 258 0.73 0.44 0 1
Maximax Nat Mean CPTKT MaxProb Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean
row/col M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 Geo-Mean
Maximax M1 - 0.73 0.51 0.95 0.98 0.76 0.77
Nat Mean M2 1.37 - 0.43 1.44 3.17 1.5 1.35
CPTKT M3 1.97 2.33 - 2 3.42 2.38 2.3
MaxProb M4 1.05 0.69 0.5 - 1.03 0.76 0.77
Cntrst Ind M5 1.02 0.32 0.29 0.97 - 0.31 0.67
Cntrst Mean M6 1.31 0.67 0.42 1.32 3.2 - 1.19
Unique M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Maximax M1 - 98 92 83 103 98 94.8
Nat Mean M2 85 - 30 68 33 9 45
CPTKT M3 92 43 - 91 61 46 66.6
MaxProb M4 69 67 77 - 77 73 72.6
Cntrst Ind M5 79 22 37 67 - 15 44
Cntrst Mean M6 88 12 36 77 29 - 48.4
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NCC/N Maximax Nat Mean CPTKT MaxProb Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Maximax M1 - 0.51 0.54 0.51 0.49 0.51
Nat Mean M2 - 0.66 0.56 0.64 0.69
CPTKT M3 - 0.56 0.61 0.65
MaxProb M4 - 0.53 0.55
Cntrst Ind M5 - 0.64
Cntrst Mean M6 -
- NCW/N
NWC/N -
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Maximax M1 - 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.12 0.14
Nat Mean M2 0.19 - 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.02
CPTKT M3 0.23 0.07 - 0.18 0.09 0.09
MaxProb M4 0.15 0.08 0.1 - 0.09 0.11
Cntrst Ind M5 0.17 0.01 0.04 0.11 - 0.01
Cntrst Mean M6 0.19 0.01 0.05 0.13 0.01 -
% overlap M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 GM
Maximax M1 - 0.64 0.66 0.69 0.61 0.64 0.65
Nat Mean M2 0.64 - 0.84 0.7 0.83 0.96 0.79
CPTKT M3 0.66 0.84 - 0.66 0.77 0.83 0.75
MaxProb M4 0.69 0.7 0.66 - 0.66 0.68 0.68
Cntrst Ind M5 0.61 0.83 0.77 0.66 - 0.86 0.74
Cntrst Mean M6 0.64 0.96 0.83 0.68 0.86 - 0.78
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Experience Blank Slate
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Maximax 244 0.7 0.46 0 1
NatMean 239 0.77 0.42 0 1
CPTKT 244 0.75 0.44 0 1
MaxProb 235 0.76 0.43 0 1
Cntrst Ind 228 0.76 0.43 0 1
Cntrst Mean 238 0.74 0.44 0 1
Maximax Nat Mean CPTKT MaxProb Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean
row/col M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 Geo-Mean
Maximax M1 - 0.63 0.74 0.81 0.95 0.88 0.8
Nat Mean M2 1.58 - 1.18 1.3 2.33 4.33 1.66
CPTKT M3 1.35 0.85 - 1.11 1.38 1.33 1.21
MaxProb M4 1.24 0.77 0.9 - 1.16 1.1 1.02
Cntrst Ind M5 1.06 0.43 0.73 0.86 - 0.8 0.81
Cntrst Mean M6 1.13 0.23 0.75 0.91 1.25 - 0.88
Unique M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Maximax M1 - 65 73 70 77 67 70.4
Nat Mean M2 60 - 32 54 33 16 39
CPTKT M3 73 37 - 81 64 50 61
MaxProb M4 61 50 72 - 62 60 61
Cntrst Ind M5 61 22 48 55 - 16 40.4
Cntrst Mean M6 61 15 44 63 26 - 41.8
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NCC/N Maximax Nat Mean CPTKT MaxProb Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Maximax M1 - 0.59 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.56
Nat Mean M2 - 0.66 0.62 0.66 0.69
CPTKT M3 - 0.56 0.6 0.62
MaxProb M4 - 0.57 0.58
Cntrst Ind M5 - 0.66
Cntrst Mean M6 -
- NCW/N
NWC/N -
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Maximax M1 - 0.09 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.11
Nat Mean M2 0.15 - 0.08 0.1 0.04 0.05
CPTKT M3 0.17 0.05 - 0.14 0.09 0.09
MaxProb M4 0.14 0.08 0.15 - 0.08 0.12
Cntrst Ind M5 0.14 0.02 0.09 0.09 - 0.02
Cntrst Mean M6 0.14 0.01 0.08 0.1 0.02 -
% overlap M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 GM
Maximax M1 - 0.74 0.71 0.72 0.68 0.73 0.71
Nat Mean M2 0.74 - 0.85 0.76 0.84 0.93 0.82
CPTKT M3 0.71 0.85 - 0.68 0.73 0.8 0.75
MaxProb M4 0.72 0.76 0.68 - 0.7 0.72 0.72
Cntrst Ind M5 0.68 0.84 0.73 0.7 - 0.86 0.76
Cntrst Mean M6 0.73 0.93 0.8 0.72 0.86 - 0.81
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Enumerated Experience - Probability Estimation
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Maximax 242 0.55 0.5 0 1
NatMean 229 0.66 0.47 0 1
CPTKT 242 0.67 0.47 0 1
MaxProb 233 0.63 0.48 0 1
Cntrst Ind 235 0.66 0.48 0 1
Cntrst Mean 233 0.66 0.47 0 1
Maximax Nat Mean CPTKT MaxProb Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean
row/col M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 Geo-Mean
Maximax M1 - 0.58 0.45 0.61 0.61 0.57 0.56
Nat Mean M2 1.71 - 0.69 1.23 0.85 0.67 1.14
CPTKT M3 2.2 1.45 - 1.43 1.26 1.35 1.53
MaxProb M4 1.64 0.81 0.7 - 0.8 0.76 0.87
Cntrst Ind M5 1.63 1.18 0.79 1.25 - 1 1.19
Cntrst Mean M6 1.76 1.5 0.74 1.31 1 - 1.25
Unique M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Maximax M1 - 83 80 65 93 84 81
Nat Mean M2 70 - 44 54 21 7 39.2
CPTKT M3 80 57 - 91 70 57 71
MaxProb M4 56 58 82 - 64 59 63.8
Cntrst Ind M5 86 27 63 66 - 22 52.8
Cntrst Mean M6 75 11 48 59 20 - 42.6
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NCC/N Maximax Nat Mean CPTKT MaxProb Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Maximax M1 - 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.39 0.41
Nat Mean M2 - 0.52 0.48 0.56 0.59
CPTKT M3 - 0.44 0.49 0.52
MaxProb M4 - 0.46 0.48
Cntrst Ind M5 - 0.58
Cntrst Mean M6 -
- NCW/N
NWC/N -
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Maximax M1 - 0.09 0.1 0.08 0.1 0.1
Nat Mean M2 0.19 - 0.09 0.1 0.02 0.01
CPTKT M3 0.22 0.09 - 0.18 0.12 0.1
MaxProb M4 0.14 0.08 0.14 - 0.08 0.08
Cntrst Ind M5 0.22 0.02 0.11 0.12 - 0.02
Cntrst Mean M6 0.2 0.01 0.09 0.12 0.02 -
% overlap M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 GM
Maximax M1 - 0.67 0.68 0.73 0.6 0.66 0.67
Nat Mean M2 0.67 - 0.77 0.73 0.84 0.95 0.79
CPTKT M3 0.68 0.77 - 0.63 0.7 0.77 0.71
MaxProb M4 0.73 0.73 0.63 - 0.68 0.72 0.7
Cntrst Ind M5 0.6 0.84 0.7 0.68 - 0.86 0.73
Cntrst Mean M6 0.66 0.95 0.77 0.72 0.86 - 0.79
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Experienced Blank Slate - Probability Estimation
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Maximax 247 0.53 0.5 0 1
NatMean 241 0.68 0.47 0 1
CPTKT 247 0.66 0.47 0 1
MaxProb 240 0.65 0.48 0 1
Cntrst Ind 236 0.68 0.47 0 1
Cntrst Mean 244 0.68 0.47 0 1
Maximax Nat Mean CPTKT MaxProb Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean
row/col M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 Geo-Mean
Maximax M1 - 0.37 0.45 0.48 0.43 0.37 0.42
Nat Mean M2 2.7 - 1.06 1.45 1.27 0.63 1.6
CPTKT M3 2.22 0.95 - 1.23 1.09 0.8 1.31
MaxProb M4 2.09 0.69 0.81 - 0.81 0.66 0.95
Cntrst Ind M5 2.35 0.79 0.92 1.24 - 0.54 1.3
Cntrst Mean M6 2.68 1.6 1.25 1.52 1.86 - 1.87
Unique M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Maximax M1 - 76 87 76 83 82 80.8
Nat Mean M2 70 - 34 48 27 12 38.2
CPTKT M3 87 40 - 79 51 37 58.8
MaxProb M4 69 47 72 - 54 55 59.4
Cntrst Ind M5 72 22 40 50 - 17 40.2
Cntrst Mean M6 79 15 34 59 25 - 42.4
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NCC/N Maximax Nat Mean CPTKT MaxProb Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Maximax M1 - 0.44 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.43
Nat Mean M2 - 0.58 0.54 0.6 0.63
CPTKT M3 - 0.48 0.55 0.59
MaxProb M4 - 0.52 0.53
Cntrst Ind M5 - 0.61
Cntrst Mean M6 -
- NCW/N
NWC/N -
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Maximax M1 - 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.08
Nat Mean M2 0.22 - 0.08 0.1 0.03 0.02
CPTKT M3 0.24 0.06 - 0.15 0.07 0.06
MaxProb M4 0.19 0.07 0.14 - 0.07 0.09
Cntrst Ind M5 0.21 0.03 0.08 0.1 - 0.02
Cntrst Mean M6 0.24 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.03 -
% overlap M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 GM
Maximax M1 - 0.7 0.65 0.7 0.67 0.67 0.68
Nat Mean M2 0.7 - 0.84 0.79 0.87 0.94 0.82
CPTKT M3 0.65 0.84 - 0.69 0.79 0.85 0.76
MaxProb M4 0.7 0.79 0.69 - 0.75 0.76 0.74
Cntrst Ind M5 0.67 0.87 0.79 0.75 - 0.88 0.79
Cntrst Mean M6 0.67 0.94 0.85 0.76 0.88 - 0.82
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D.2 Tournament 2
Experienced Risk
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Nat Mean 242 0.62 0.49 0 1
Cntrst Ind 245 0.59 0.49 0 1
Cntrst Mean 242 0.6 0.49 0 1
CPTKT 253 0.6 0.49 0 1
CPTFIT 253 0.61 0.49 0 1
CPT-S 253 0.64 0.48 0 1
Nat Mean Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean CPTKT CPTFIT CPT-S
row/col M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 Geo-Mean
Nat Mean M1 - 1.32 1.88 0.78 0.95 0.84 0.97
Cntrst Ind M2 0.76 - 1.04 0.73 0.95 0.84 0.87
Cntrst Mean M3 0.53 0.96 - 0.57 0.94 0.83 0.84
CPTKT M4 1.29 1.36 1.75 - 1.03 0.92 1.1
CPTFIT M5 1.06 1.05 1.06 0.97 - 0.6 1.01
CPT-S M6 1.2 1.2 1.21 1.09 1.67 - 1.19
Unique M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Nat Mean M1 - 40 22 11 145 145 73
Cntrst Ind M2 43 - 48 45 134 133 81
Cntrst Mean M3 22 45 - 29 139 142 75
CPTKT M4 22 53 40 - 150 145 82
CPTFIT M5 156 141 149 150 - 24 124
CPT-S M6 156 140 152 145 24 - 123
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NCC/N Nat Mean Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean CPTKT CPTFIT CPT-S
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Nat Mean M1 - 0.48 0.52 0.55 0.35 0.35
Cntrst Ind M2 - 0.46 0.47 0.32 0.32
Cntrst Mean M3 - 0.51 0.33 0.34
CPTKT M4 - 0.37 0.37
CPTFIT M5 - 0.56
CPT-S M6 -
- NCW/N
NWC/N -
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Nat Mean M1 - 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.21 0.2
Cntrst Ind M2 0.04 - 0.07 0.07 0.22 0.22
Cntrst Mean M3 0.02 0.06 - 0.05 0.2 0.19
CPTKT M4 0.02 0.08 0.07 - 0.2 0.19
CPTFIT M5 0.2 0.24 0.22 0.22 - 0.03
CPT-S M6 0.21 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.06 -
% overlap M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 GM
Nat Mean M1 - 0.79 0.9 0.92 0.37 0.37 0.62
Cntrst Ind M2 0.79 - 0.78 0.77 0.43 0.43 0.62
Cntrst Mean M3 0.9 0.78 - 0.85 0.4 0.39 0.62
CPTKT M4 0.92 0.77 0.85 - 0.4 0.42 0.63
CPTFIT M5 0.37 0.43 0.4 0.4 - 0.91 0.47
CPT-S M6 0.37 0.43 0.39 0.42 0.91 - 0.47
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Enumerated Experience
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Nat Mean 255 0.75 0.43 0 1
Cntrst Ind 244 0.73 0.45 0 1
Cntrst Mean 258 0.73 0.44 0 1
CPTKT 268 0.77 0.42 0 1
CPTFIT 268 0.77 0.42 0 1
CPT-S 268 0.74 0.44 0 1
Nat Mean Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean CPTKT CPTFIT CPT-S
row/col M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 Geo-Mean
Nat Mean M1 - 3.17 1.5 0.43 0.81 0.82 0.9
Cntrst Ind M2 0.32 - 0.31 0.29 0.77 0.78 0.62
Cntrst Mean M3 0.67 3.2 - 0.42 0.82 0.83 0.86
CPTKT M4 2.33 3.42 2.38 - 0.92 0.93 1.35
CPTFIT M5 1.23 1.3 1.22 1.08 - 1.53 1.22
CPT-S M6 1.22 1.29 1.21 1.07 0.65 - 1.14
Unique M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Nat Mean M1 - 33 9 30 129 122 65
Cntrst Ind M2 22 - 15 37 125 114 63
Cntrst Mean M3 12 29 - 36 135 126 68
CPTKT M4 43 61 46 - 146 135 86
CPTFIT M5 142 149 145 146 - 43 125
CPT-S M6 135 138 136 135 43 - 117
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NCC/N Nat Mean Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean CPTKT CPTFIT CPT-S
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Nat Mean M1 - 0.64 0.69 0.66 0.54 0.52
Cntrst Ind M2 - 0.64 0.61 0.51 0.5
Cntrst Mean M3 - 0.65 0.53 0.53
CPTKT M4 - 0.59 0.56
CPTFIT M5 - 0.67
CPT-S M6 -
- NCW/N
NWC/N -
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Nat Mean M1 - 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.17 0.18
Cntrst Ind M2 0.01 - 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.16
Cntrst Mean M3 0.01 0.01 - 0.05 0.16 0.17
CPTKT M4 0.07 0.09 0.09 - 0.17 0.2
CPTFIT M5 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.17 - 0.1
CPT-S M6 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.06 -
% overlap M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 GM
Nat Mean M1 - 0.83 0.96 0.84 0.47 0.49 0.69
Cntrst Ind M2 0.83 - 0.86 0.77 0.44 0.48 0.65
Cntrst Mean M3 0.96 0.86 - 0.83 0.46 0.49 0.69
CPTKT M4 0.84 0.77 0.83 - 0.45 0.49 0.65
CPTFIT M5 0.47 0.44 0.46 0.45 - 0.84 0.51
CPT-S M6 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.84 - 0.54
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Experience Blank Slate
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Nat Mean 239 0.77 0.42 0 1
Cntrst Ind 228 0.76 0.43 0 1
Cntrst Mean 238 0.74 0.44 0 1
CPTKT 244 0.75 0.44 0 1
CPTFIT 244 0.76 0.43 0 1
CPT-S 244 0.78 0.42 0 1
Nat Mean Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean CPTKT CPTFIT CPT-S
row/col M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 Geo-Mean
Nat Mean M1 - 2.33 4.33 1.18 1.04 0.97 1.2
Cntrst Ind M2 0.43 - 0.8 0.73 0.93 0.86 0.82
Cntrst Mean M3 0.23 1.25 - 0.75 0.99 0.91 0.88
CPTKT M4 0.85 1.38 1.33 - 1.03 0.96 1.07
CPTFIT M5 0.96 1.08 1.01 0.97 - 0.83 0.99
CPT-S M6 1.03 1.17 1.1 1.04 1.21 - 1.1
Unique M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Nat Mean M1 - 33 16 32 119 114 63
Cntrst Ind M2 22 - 16 48 116 109 62
Cntrst Mean M3 15 26 - 44 118 115 64
CPTKT M4 37 64 50 - 122 120 79
CPTFIT M5 124 132 124 122 - 53 111
CPT-S M6 119 125 121 120 53 - 108
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NCC/N Nat Mean Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean CPTKT CPTFIT CPT-S
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Nat Mean M1 - 0.66 0.69 0.66 0.54 0.55
Cntrst Ind M2 - 0.66 0.6 0.5 0.51
Cntrst Mean M3 - 0.62 0.51 0.52
CPTKT M4 - 0.53 0.55
CPTFIT M5 - 0.64
CPT-S M6 -
- NCW/N
NWC/N -
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Nat Mean M1 - 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.18 0.17
Cntrst Ind M2 0.02 - 0.02 0.09 0.17 0.17
Cntrst Mean M3 0.01 0.02 - 0.08 0.17 0.16
CPTKT M4 0.05 0.09 0.09 - 0.18 0.16
CPTFIT M5 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.2 - 0.1
CPT-S M6 0.17 0.18 0.2 0.19 0.12 -
% overlap M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 GM
Nat Mean M1 - 0.84 0.93 0.85 0.48 0.5 0.69
Cntrst Ind M2 0.84 - 0.86 0.73 0.45 0.48 0.65
Cntrst Mean M3 0.93 0.86 - 0.8 0.48 0.49 0.69
CPTKT M4 0.85 0.73 0.8 - 0.49 0.5 0.65
CPTFIT M5 0.48 0.45 0.48 0.49 - 0.79 0.53
CPT-S M6 0.5 0.48 0.49 0.5 0.79 - 0.54
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Enumerated Experience - Probability Estimation
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Nat Mean 229 0.66 0.47 0 1
Cntrst Ind 235 0.66 0.48 0 1
Cntrst Mean 233 0.66 0.47 0 1
CPTKT 242 0.67 0.47 0 1
CPTFIT 242 0.66 0.47 0 1
CPT-S 242 0.7 0.46 0 1
Nat Mean Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean CPTKT CPTFIT CPT-S
row/col M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 Geo-Mean
Nat Mean M1 - 0.85 0.67 0.69 0.95 0.84 0.85
Cntrst Ind M2 1.18 - 1 0.79 1.05 0.9 0.96
Cntrst Mean M3 1.5 1 - 0.74 1 0.88 0.93
CPTKT M4 1.45 1.26 1.35 - 1.04 0.91 1.12
CPTFIT M5 1.05 0.95 1 0.96 - 0.64 0.96
CPT-S M6 1.19 1.11 1.13 1.1 1.56 - 1.16
Unique M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Nat Mean M1 - 21 7 44 121 116 62
Cntrst Ind M2 27 - 22 63 128 121 72
Cntrst Mean M3 11 20 - 48 127 118 65
CPTKT M4 57 70 57 - 120 113 83
CPTFIT M5 134 135 136 120 - 41 113
CPT-S M6 129 128 127 113 41 - 108
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NCC/N Nat Mean Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean CPTKT CPTFIT CPT-S
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Nat Mean M1 - 0.56 0.59 0.52 0.44 0.44
Cntrst Ind M2 - 0.58 0.49 0.45 0.46
Cntrst Mean M3 - 0.52 0.44 0.44
CPTKT M4 - 0.45 0.44
CPTFIT M5 - 0.58
CPT-S M6 -
- NCW/N
NWC/N -
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Nat Mean M1 - 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.16 0.16
Cntrst Ind M2 0.02 - 0.02 0.11 0.15 0.14
Cntrst Mean M3 0.01 0.02 - 0.09 0.17 0.16
CPTKT M4 0.09 0.12 0.1 - 0.18 0.19
CPTFIT M5 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 - 0.06
CPT-S M6 0.18 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.1 -
% overlap M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 GM
Nat Mean M1 - 0.84 0.95 0.77 0.44 0.46 0.66
Cntrst Ind M2 0.84 - 0.86 0.7 0.43 0.46 0.63
Cntrst Mean M3 0.95 0.86 - 0.77 0.43 0.47 0.66
CPTKT M4 0.77 0.7 0.77 - 0.49 0.52 0.64
CPTFIT M5 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.49 - 0.84 0.51
CPT-S M6 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.52 0.84 - 0.53
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Experienced Blank Slate - Probability Estimation
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Nat Mean 241 0.68 0.47 0 1
Cntrst Ind 236 0.68 0.47 0 1
Cntrst Mean 244 0.68 0.47 0 1
CPTKT 247 0.66 0.47 0 1
CPTFIT 248 0.67 0.47 0 1
CPT-S 248 0.7 0.46 0 1
Nat Mean Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean CPTKT CPTFIT CPT-S
row/col M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 Geo-Mean
Nat Mean M1 - 1.27 0.63 1.06 1.05 0.94 1
Cntrst Ind M2 0.79 - 0.54 0.92 1.05 0.93 0.93
Cntrst Mean M3 1.6 1.86 - 1.25 1.07 0.97 1.12
CPTKT M4 0.95 1.09 0.8 - 1.08 0.97 1
CPTFIT M5 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.93 - 0.76 0.92
CPT-S M6 1.07 1.07 1.03 1.03 1.32 - 1.07
Unique M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Nat Mean M1 - 27 12 34 120 110 61
Cntrst Ind M2 22 - 17 40 111 101 58
Cntrst Mean M3 15 25 - 34 124 111 62
CPTKT M4 40 51 37 - 121 108 71
CPTFIT M5 127 123 128 122 - 51 110
CPT-S M6 117 113 115 109 51 - 101
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NCC/N Nat Mean Cntrst Ind Cntrst Mean CPTKT CPTFIT CPT-S
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Nat Mean M1 - 0.6 0.63 0.58 0.47 0.48
Cntrst Ind M2 - 0.61 0.55 0.46 0.47
Cntrst Mean M3 - 0.59 0.48 0.49
CPTKT M4 - 0.45 0.46
CPTFIT M5 - 0.58
CPT-S M6 -
- NCW/N
NWC/N -
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Nat Mean M1 - 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.17
Cntrst Ind M2 0.03 - 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.17
Cntrst Mean M3 0.03 0.03 - 0.08 0.18 0.17
CPTKT M4 0.06 0.07 0.06 - 0.19 0.18
CPTFIT M5 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.21 - 0.09
CPT-S M6 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.12 -
% overlap M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 GM
Nat Mean M1 - 0.87 0.94 0.84 0.48 0.52 0.7
Cntrst Ind M2 0.87 - 0.88 0.79 0.5 0.54 0.7
Cntrst Mean M3 0.94 0.88 - 0.85 0.48 0.53 0.71
CPTKT M4 0.84 0.79 0.85 - 0.5 0.55 0.69
CPTFIT M5 0.48 0.5 0.48 0.5 - 0.8 0.54
CPT-S M6 0.52 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.8 - 0.58
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